by Hilary Tone

Through more aggressive public diplomacy elements such as listening, cultural and educational exchange, advocacy, and broadcasting, Spain is in a good position to foster understanding and goodwill with its Latin American counterparts.

Executive Summary

            Spain’s Latin American comrades can easily be forgotten on the other side of the Atlantic.  However, this has not stopped Spain from reminding the rest of the Hispanic world that it represents la madre patria[1], or mother country, to her daughter countries in Latin America (sus hijas) despite their physical distance from each other.  Spain has exploited this Ibero-American connection to maintain its role as a leader in the Hispanic world and most importantly, to maintain its economic interests in the Latin American region.  After a thorough study of this relationship, it is clear that Spain’s foreign policy towards Latin America is lacking elements of soft power and public diplomacy, and today’s unstable international context provides the perfect opportunity to pursue these elements.  This brief therefore recommends that to maintain its national and economic interests within Latin America, Spain needs to make the Ibero-American issue a priority within the European Union, to establish relationships with individual Latin American countries, and to aggressively pursue public diplomacy in the region.  This policy brief will outline the following: 1) a background of Spanish foreign policy in the past 10 to 20 years, including that pertaining to Latin America and the role of soft power and public diplomacy; 2) the aforementioned policy elements in today’s world within the past two to five years; 3) conclusions about how well these policies and affairs have worked for Spain’s national interest, and finally, 4) detailed recommendations for the future.  Sections will identify Spanish objectives and tools used to obtain these objectives in addition to addressing the implications for Spain’s foreign policy future, based on the information provided in this policy brief.      

Background

Spain’s shift from dictatorship to democracy after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 was a significant moment in the nation’s history and foreign policy.  Another significant moment was its induction into the community of European nations, now known as the European Union.  Since then, Spain has harbored somewhat of a double identity.  It is undoubtedly a member of the European community, surrounded on all borders by its fellow members, but it also has deep ties to the Latin American world (the two regions are often referred to collectively as Ibero-America.) Spain’s transition to democracy as well as its two competing political parties, the more conservative PP and the left-leaning PSOE, have created tensions within the government and hence influenced foreign policy.  As a nation, Spain has historically placed more priority on its membership within the EU rather than any particular obligations to Latin America, especially since its primary foreign policy objective leading up to 1986 was induction into the EU.  There is no doubt that in 1986, Spain’s foreign policy experienced a significant shift as a result of becoming a member of a much larger union.  Spain’s objectives in putting the EU first are likely due to proximity to member nations, greater advantages and benefits to pursuing more aggressive foreign policy within this community, and likely, pressure that the EU could put on Spain as a member, more so than any collection of nations an ocean away.  In summary, two of the most important transitions over the past few decades that have influenced Spain’s personality, objectives and foreign policy are its transition to democracy after the Franco dictatorship and its induction into the EU.

As far as Latin America’s role in its foreign policy background, Spain serves (or likes to think that it serves) as a bridge between Latin America and the EU.  It has frequently leveraged its position between the EU and Latin America, but to re-iterate, it is clear that Spain, in its government and in public opinion[2], puts more emphasis on courting the members of the EU rather than those they are innately connected to by a common language, culture and heritage.   Such an approach could be considered hypocritical in that Spain as a nation claims to have deeply-rooted ties to its Latin American counterparts, when in fact, it is more focused on appeasing its European neighbors.  Undoubtedly, pressure from the EU has contributed to these priorities, especially when the EU as a whole has often excused Spain from taking action in Latin America, rather than encouraging it.  Regardless, Latin America as a region has not been a top priority for the Spanish government. 

Another point about Spain’s historical relationship with this region is that ever since Spain made the full transition to democracy, it has been more willing to work with those foreign nations that have also made that transition or that seem on the right path to democracy.  Its successful political and economic transformation after the death of Francisco Franco has provided a model for Latin American nations within their own sphere, meaning Latin American countries could look to Spain rather than the United States for a model to emulate.  Such an image of Spain plays an important role in the type of policy and diplomacy it has pursued and can pursue in the future in the Latin American region.

A key point to make about the way in which Latin America has been worked into Spanish foreign policy is to examine the kind of approach Spain has taken to the entire region.  Generally speaking, Spain has taken a multilateral, or global approach to the region, rather than seeking relationships with individual states.  A multilateral approach has been easier for Spanish foreign policy in the past because its interests and investments in Latin American were region-wide.  Whether or not this approach has been effective will be addressed towards the end of this policy brief, but evidence shows that it is likely in Spain’s better interest to form alliances with specific countries, especially given the new pockets of Spanish interest developing across the region.  In addition, a global approach not only ignores the unique features, needs and views of each country, but lends to the possible argument that Spain simply does not care enough to form several smaller foreign policies, which could create a negative image of Spain in the region.

Another critical element in this multilateral relationship for the past 16 years has been the Ibero-American summits, an idea initiated by Spain and Mexico and first executed in 1991.  These annual summits provide a forum for heads of state from both Spain and Latin American nations to come together and address issues specific to the “Hispanidad,”[3] or the Hispanic World.  As a region, Ibero-America supports issues such as free trade, fighting drug trafficking, and following the principles of the UN charter.  A few prominent positions, such the Ibero-American General Sectariat, have arisen out of these summits with the intention of further improving the summit system through organization and helping to achieve consensus among nations.  In addition, as time has passed, meetings have been held at the summits outside of the predetermined agenda to provide another forum for groups to present diverse issues specific to their nations. Despite the seemingly-cooperative nature of the Ibero-American summit, questions still remain as to whether or not they are simply a tool of power or manipulation on Spain’s end; if these summits are merely “an instrument of Spanish policy.”[4] Spain intends to maintain a leading role in these summits, but given their lengthy history, it is clearly necessary that all of the participating members adopt them as their own, rather than attending just to appease their mother country.

The economic relationship between these regions is the most important background issue.  For years, Spanish direct investment, trade and its private sector have played a significant role in the Latin American economy, and vice versa.  As early as 1981, almost half of Spain’s $1.7 billion in direct investments abroad were in Latin America.[5]  However, in the later 1980s and early 1990s, due to pressures and restrictions from the EU, such as the adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy, trade relations fell significantly.  Foreign direct investment, however, and the presence of private Spanish businesses, most notably Telefónica de España, was booming in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Five of the six major Spanish banks were in full operation in the 1980s and 1990s as well.  Though these stakes in the Latin American region have worked well for both parties economically, private sector operations over time have contributed to a negative image of Spain as a returning conqueror.  For a region that is historically opposed to intervention and interference from hegemonic states, Spain has walked a fine line in imposing so much of its domestic business on Latin American countries.  There are evident repercussions for Spain in having so much economic (and mainly private) investment in this region; repercussions that would need strong diplomacy to counter them for the sake of protecting its national interests.

The role of Spanish soft power and public diplomacy with regards to Latin America is troubling in that historically, there is little.  In researching relevant information for this brief, it was difficult to come across any significant instances of aggressive public diplomacy towards this region.  Granted, there are the typical cultural and educational exchanges, and it could also be argued that the Ibero-American summits serve as a form of soft power and public diplomacy because they foster listening in an international, diplomatic environment.  Nonetheless, the notion of the “hispanosphere,”[6] or the interconnectedness and solidarity among Latin American nations, may hinder any Spanish notion towards pursuing public diplomacy in its daughter countries.  Simply stated, it’s possible that Spain perceives enough of a connection or bond with Latin America to warrant complacency and a feeling that such diplomatic outreach is unnecessary.  Spain believes that it is and always will be well-liked and respected in Latin America without having to work too hard for it because of the “we are just like them” mentality.  In reality, the discrepancy between the Spanish and Latin American lifestyles makes these regions quite different.  Spain is a cosmopolitan, First World European country, whereas many Latin American countries are struggling to survive as Third World nations.  It is inaccurate to assume that these regions are more alike than different, because it is clear that this is not the case.  Therefore, it is certain that whatever innate connections these two regions may share is not so strong as to negate the need for further public diplomacy and soft power.

The tensions caused by Spanish investment in this region severely affect and limit the kind of public diplomacy it can pursue.  Moreover, because Spain has generally taken a multilateral approach to dealing with Latin American issues, it is therefore more difficult to address bilateral frictions created by Spanish investment.  As touched upon earlier, if Spain wants to maintain strong economic interests in the region, it has to promote a positive image using soft power and public diplomacy.  Spain has traditionally used soft as opposed to hard power because of what is available in its “toolbox,” but its resources for public diplomacy have been insufficient.  Overall, Spain’s discrepancies, negative image and lack of aggressive soft power and public diplomacy significantly impact its relationship with Latin America today, and contribute to what it could possibly do in order to maintain its national interests.

Recent Past and the Present

When speaking of the past two to five years, there are three Spanish leaders crucial to understanding the recent developments in foreign policy towards the Latin American region: King Juan Carlos, former Prime Minister Jose María Aznar, and current Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.  King Juan Carlos has been the presiding ruler since the death of Franco, and serves as a key diplomatic figure whose importance in today’s issues will be discussed a bit later.  Aznar was more of a conservative prime minister from the PP, so when the left-leaning PSOE candidate Zapatero came to office in 2004, he made significant changes.  Likely the biggest change was severing Aznar’s close relationship with the United States and pulling Spanish troops out of Iraq, a welcome change for the people of Spain.  After only three years in office, Zapatero has made efforts to improve Spain’s relationship with Latin America.

After September 11, 2001, Latin America was once again forgotten.  As a region not under the immediate threat of extreme terrorism, it was ignored in foreign policy, especially by the United States.  However, Zapatero, in an enlightened diplomatic move, emphasized that the Ibero-American priority was at the top of his nation’s agenda.  Though this may seem on the surface like a commendable change in Spanish foreign policy and diplomacy, to tend to the region that is so often left behind, it cannot go without saying that Spain indeed has a vested interest in having Latin American nations on its side, and that its actions have not supported its words.

As mentioned in the beginning of this brief, Spain grapples with a double identity of both European and Latin American associations. Though it has tried to act a bridge between the two, as a voice for Latin America within the European Union, it is without question that having the backing of Latin American countries provides a clear strategic advantage for Spain within the EU.  Evidence of this mentality can be seen in the  moves Zapatero made in South America.  He agreed to lend military planes to Colombia and to help mediate peace talks in ending Colombia’s civil war; he also assisted in the Mexican-led peace talks, in conjunction with the Venezuelan and Brazilian ambassadors, by meeting with the head of the National Liberation Army.[7] As was also touched upon earlier, though the Ibero-American priority is supposedly at the top of the agenda for Spain, in reality, the EU outweighs Latin America in importance to the Spanish government.  Likely one of the most important reasons for this reality is Spanish public opinion – its citizens care more about the issues involving the countries on their borders rather than those across the Atlantic with whom they claim to share a deeply-rooted, historical and cultural connection.

Individual Latin American nations, namely Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia, have recently become the root of internal political controversy within Spain.  Though the Spanish government has made efforts to include the controversial Cuba and Fidel Castro into its foreign policy (i.e. Aznar’s invitation to Castro to visit the royal palace in Madrid), sentiment recently has been to exclude the state altogether.  Cuba is not a member of the Organization of the American States or the Summits of the Americas; however, it does participate in the Ibero-American summits.  Originally, the intention for its membership was to promote its transition to democracy (recall Spain’s position as a positive model for such a transition).  Because Cuba, especially under the leadership of the Castro family, does not appear to be making any progress towards this transition, those in opposition to Cuba’s participation have become more vocal.  Spain is thus divided between those who want it excluded and those who believe its exclusion would cause more harm than good to the entire summit system, not to mention their high hopes for human rights and democratization.

Zapatero’s election was a welcome change for Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.  Ill will abounded between Zapatero’s predecessor, Aznar, and Chavez in the press and in diplomatic gatherings, largely due to the discrepancy between Aznar’s conservative administration and Chavez’s socialist government.  Thus, Zapatero brought a positive change to the hostile confrontation between Aznar and Chavez, and since then, the new prime minister has made bold moves.  The most significant and controversial move was the signing of an arms agreement between Spain and Venezuela in 2005, worth almost $2 billion.  This agreement also divided the country between the PSOE party, whom Zapatero represented and who support this move, and the PP, who condemn the arms sale because it not only complies with Chavez’s controversial policies, but it goes against those who support the development of a democratic rather than a populist government in Venezuela.  The Venezuela issue therefore creates another rift within Spain because it divides the country and perpetuates political tensions between the two parties.

Another issue in working with problematic Latin American heads of state is Zapatero’s approach to Bolivia.  Because Evo Morales, Bolivia’s president, is thought to be somewhat of a protégé of Hugo Chavez, Spain has tread cautiously in this area.  Zapatero refused to appear with Morales at a press conference in early 2006, while some of his officials declined to meet with Morales at all[8].  To no surprise, foreign business (namely Bolivian threats to nationalize) appears to play a large role in the so-called “icy” relationship between Bolivia and Spain.  In his efforts to expand Spanish influence and involvement, Zapatero even approached Argentinean president Nestor Kirchner for help in restoring relations with this nation, because Argentina has functioned as a government that could “contain” Bolivia.[9]

Another thorn in Spain’s side is the influx of illegal immigrants from Latin America, which has become a significant problem for both Spain and Portugal.  In 2006, Portugal’s border patrol alone seized about 1,300 false identification documents.[10]  Spain’s objectives in this situation are to break up the so-called illegal immigration “networks” from Latin America.  As of early 2007, Spain and Portugal agreed to exchange police officer experts on false documents as well as investigation teams who will be deployed to major airports in both countries.  This instance represents a rare case in which Spain has chosen to use hard instead of soft power in its relations with Latin America.  Because this problem has grown in not just Spain but its neighboring and fellow EU country Portugal, it is important to note how the Spanish government has chosen to alleviate the illegal immigration – with further policing and hard power as opposed to soft power or preferably, public diplomacy towards the Latin American region.

Economically, it is safe to say that there has been a “second wave” of Spanish investment in the region, as stated by Zapatero during his tour of the Southern Cone.[11]  Spain has invested billions in the Latin American economy, second only to the United States worldwide.  Between 1994 and 2001, of the more than $236 billion FDI from the EU, Spain was responsible for almost $118 billion.  In 2004, imports and exports between Spain and Latin America totaled over $20 billion.[12] Zapatero has also attempted to integrate his country with businesses like Mercosur, and claimed to South American nations that Spain could be their “point of entry” to Europe and the Mediterranean.[13] Such claims support the idea that once again, Spain likes to leverage its position between the EU and Latin America, and that having Latin American on its side, through trade, the private sector and the like, provides a strategic advantage for Spain and its role within the EU.  These numbers provide even more reasons why Spain needs to protects its interests abroad, and why a positive image of Spain Latin America is crucial in obtaining such a goal.

One last point to mention about Zapatero’s objectives in investing more in and generally paying more attention to Latin America is that his administration considers Latin America to be a point of contact with the United States.  Because Latin America has historically been considered the “backyard region” of the United States, it wouldn’t be far fetched to assume that Zapatero, though having severed some ties in withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq, is looking to make other connections with the United States, especially those that could benefit Spain’s national interests.  However, these efforts are hindered by a disappointing fact: that Spain has limited, even meager, resources devoted to diplomacy and foreign aid.  Though Zapatero appeared on the surface to be dedicated to devoting more to these causes, the fruits of such labor remain to be seen.  It is almost certain that if he indeed wanted to make contact with the United States through Latin America, much more would have been required of his government on the diplomatic front, especially since pursuing a relationship with the world’s hegemon could also negatively impact Spain’s image in Latin America.

Conclusions

It is difficult to judge in black and white just how effective overall Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America has been over the past few decades.  There have been both high and low points, and various shades of grey.  However, it is clear that elements of soft power and public diplomacy in Spanish foreign policy have been lacking.  The evidence brought forth in the preceding pages shows that both past and current strategies could have been much more effective.  In today’s international context, with inflammatory figures like Chavez and a deteriorating image of Spain, much more soft power and public diplomacy is necessary if Spain wishes to maintain its interests in Latin America.

As a region, it has been previously stated that Spain has more frequently resorted to the use of soft rather than hard power, mostly due to what types of tools are available to its administration.  As a member of the EU, however, Spain has more tools available to it than it would otherwise, hence its desire to leverage its position between the EU and Latin America.  Spain needs the backing of Latin American nations to provide a significant and influential voice within the EU, putting it in a unique position, and one that has likely had a negative impact on its public diplomacy and its ability to obtain certain goals in the Latin American region.  Being pulled in both directions, Spain has clearly favored the EU in its decisions and actions, with negative consequences for its fellow Ibero-American nations.

This is not to say that there have been no diplomatic or soft efforts made by the Spanish government.  Evidence shows that Zapatero was headed in the right direction and made a significant effort in this arena, even if his priorities weren’t exactly what he claims them to be.  However, the problem with these efforts, and what classifies them as “lacking” in effectiveness, has been the lack of diversity.  Its diplomacy has mainly been conducted through either personal diplomacy, such as presidential tours through South America or meetings face-to-face, and cooperative forums such as the Ibero-American summits. There have also been the lesser-known educational and cultural exchanges, though they are not often highlighted. Though these are all commendable ways to foster goodwill and pursue good diplomacy, they are not enough in number or in aggressiveness considering the vastness of Latin America and the weight its relationship carries for Spain within the EU.  As mentioned earlier, it is possible for Spain to have a negative image in its daughter countries regardless of their Ibero-American connection, especially when big business and the private sector play such a prominent role in their relationship.  Spain is better off playing the role model for Latin America in democracy and economy, not the returning conqueror. 

Even more worrisome is today’s relationship between Spain and Latin America, especially given the inflammatory and controversial nature of figures in Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia.  An example is the altercation between King Juan Carlos and Hugo Chavez at the Ibero-American summit in early November 2007, when the King told Chavez in public to “shut up.”  Not only did Chavez respond to that scenario in a heated fashion, threatening to cut off all diplomatic ties with Spain, but Zapatero was criticized by own his citizens for not responding to Chavez’s insults.  Critics in Spain argued that Zapatero lost international prestige in this situation and that Spanish diplomacy not only failed, but “neglected Spanish interests” by “cultivating the friendships of dubious leaders.”[14]  It appears that much public diplomacy needs to be geared towards this region in order to restore what diminishing prestige the Spanish image still carries in Latin America, for the sake of protecting Spanish interests.  With the growing influence of leaders like Chavez, what Spain has used for soft power and public diplomacy in the past certainly isn’t enough to obtain their objectives in the future.

Recommendations

For the benefit of future Spanish foreign policy, this brief will outline three recommendations for Spain to maintain its economic interests and promote a positive image in Latin America.  First, Spain should supplement its multilateral approach by creating relationships with individual Latin American states in addition to having a global foreign policy.  Second, Spain needs to follow through with its stated agenda of Ibero-America as a top priority by bringing a bigger Latin American voice to the EU table.  In order to do so, the third recommendation is to aggressively pursue diversified public diplomacy towards the region to foster a long-term relationship based on goodwill and understanding, which will in turn protect Spain’s national interests in the region.

Though Spain shares a deeply-rooted and historical connection with Latin America, it is wrong to assume that every Latin American nation is the same.  Spain should respect that every nation is unique in its needs, policies and objectives with its mother country, especially given the aforementioned differences in prosperity and lifestyle.  In the past it has seemed as though the only countries that receive individual attention and policy are the problematic ones, threatening to interrupt Spanish interests in the region (Cuba, Venezuela, etc.).  Spain should not wait until it is threatened to pursue alliances with specific nations; separate relationships could deter potential controversy or ill will between the two regions.  However, because the multilateral approach can be beneficial in some ways, it should not be abandoned, but rather supplemented with state-to-state relationships.  Not only would such an approach be beneficial for both parties in the long run, but it would prove that Spain cares enough to pursue individual alliances and promote a positive image.

Secondly, Spain should not just pay lip service to the Ibero-American priority but rather, prove that it is a top priority in both policy and action.  It is clear that though Zapatero has tried to claim otherwise, the Spanish government continues to favor its position within the EU rather than its position as a model in the Latin American world. Proving otherwise would not only gain and maintain friends in the region, but Spanish interests will undoubtedly be better protected.  This is not to say that Spain should neglect its responsibilities as a member of the EU, but it should stand as a strong voice for all Latin Americans rather than caving to pressures from the European community.  Representing all of Latin America gives Spain an influential place the EU table, so it is essential that Latin American nations be on Spain’s side, which leads to the final recommendation.

The third and most important recommendation is to rejuvenate and rebuild Spanish public diplomacy towards Latin America.  As mentioned before, Latin America needs to like Spain in order to ensure Spain’s sustained economic relationship, and soft power and public diplomacy are the necessary vehicles to pursue such a goal.  It does appear that Zapatero has the right idea and the capability to do so, but public diplomacy has yet to be as effective as it needs to be, especially given today’s unstable international context.  This is not the time to abandon Latin America, and Spain is in a perfect position to protect its national interests abroad by creating and sustaining long-term relationships with Latin American nations.  History shows that Latin American countries will cooperate better with larger countries who listen to, consider and respect their individuals needs, and public diplomacy is the perfect vehicle to pursue these objectives.  Through more aggressive public diplomacy elements such as listening, cultural and educational exchange, advocacy, and broadcasting, Spain is in a good position to foster understanding and goodwill with its Latin American counterparts.  Increased public diplomacy will not only prove to be more effective in pursuing its goals, but it will bring benefits for both parties and most importantly, it will ultimately ensure the protection of Spain’s national interests abroad.  To conclude these recommendations is a quote from the BBC on Spain’s image in Latin America: “The international improvement of the Spain ‘brand’ is an asset to the managed in the most serious way possible, without adding to adventures or purely verbal transformations.  In the long run, what affords rank on the international stage are responsibility, effort and the bold defence of what is one’s own.”[15]

Hilary Tone is the Communications & Outreach Associate at the Equal Rights Center in Washington, DC (@EqualRightsCntr).  Prior to joining the ERC, Hilary served as the Communications Coordinator for Border Action Network, a Tucson, Arizona-based human rights organization focused on immigrant rights issues across the state.  She is passionate about immigrant rights, and is a contributor to the Center of Public Diplomacy blog on the topic of Arizona’s immigration legislation:

• Arizona’s New Immigration Law: How State Politics Can Inhibit OUR Public Diplomacy
• France Goes Head-to-Head with Arizona for “Toughest on Immigration” Title

A 2009 graduate of the University of Southern California’s Master of Public Diplomacy Program, Tone has also served as a graduate consultant at the University of Southern California’s Writing Center, a researcher for Public Diplomacy Magazine, an intern in the U.S. State Department Office of Press Relations, and a freelance writer. She also holds a B.A. degree in Communication and Spanish Studies from Santa Clara University.

Source List

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http://www.coha.org/2005/10/10/spains-zapatero-emerges-as-a-bold-new-foreign-policy-factor-in-latin-america/

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“Spain’s Zapatero asks Argentina’s Kirchner for help with Bolivia.”  BBC Monitoring Latin America – Political.  13 May 2006.

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