by Hilary Tone and Victor Huerta Velasco

[a note from Ren: While this memo was written in 2009, the suggestions are still wise and necessary given the lack of progress in Mexico's struggle against drug-related violence.]

Executive Summary

The United States and Mexico are at a crucial point in their relationship.   As drug violence continues to plague both sides of the border at alarming rates, it has become increasingly clear that no issue in this relationship is exclusively foreign.  Though the recent Mérida Initiative attempts to alleviate drug-related problems through cooperative strategies between the U.S. and Mexico, the fact remains that the actual level of cooperation does not fit the crucial nature of this relationship.  Mexico has devoted far more resources and funding to this issue than has the U.S., and given the national interests at risk for both of these countries, such an imbalance is dangerous and potentially detrimental to the strategic opportunities that each country presents to its neighbor.

The impact on the U.S. should Mexico fail to address this rising violence cannot be overstated. The risks of Mexico failing to undermine the power of the drug cartels are enormous and a serious decline into further chaos would have profound geopolitical implications for the U.S. Weapons flowing south are used to kill and coerce the Mexican military and police forces, and there are also signs that this violence is spreading into the U.S as the cartels expand further north. In addition, cartels control well-trained, highly armed tactical groups used to enforce their authority in the U.S. These groups pose a critical threat to U.S. police departments and border patrol, neither of which are trained or armed to face them.  In addition, the constant flow of weapons will not allow the Mexican government to stop using the military to combat the cartels, thus this situation cannot transition from a national security threat to a public security problem handled by local police forces. This will undermine police reform, corrupt the military and increase human rights abuses.   Furthermore, it is U.S. demand for drugs that fuels and exacerbates this crisis, a fact that has been openly admitted by U.S. senior officials in the past few months. Therefore, it is crucial for the security of both countries that the U.S. take serious measures and assume responsibility for its role in this crisis.

Since the end of its revolution in 1920, Mexico has never faced such levels of widespread violence, social instability and threats to its national security and viability as a state. This unprecedented crisis has forced the Mexican government to recognize the inefficiency of its security apparatus and that the complexity and magnitude of this crisis cannot be solved by Mexico alone. It has therefore sought an unparalleled level of security and judicial reform, and it even reached out to the U.S. for direct assistance, an unprecedented move.  Although these measures have been significant, the Mexican government has much to accomplish to avoid the failure of its institutions. Its military, the only enforcement institution that is still generally unscathed from drug corruption, is on the verge of a potential crisis. Since 2000, over 140,000 military personnel have deserted the army, many joining the ranks of organized crime. Its intervention in urban law enforcement has caused a spike in human rights violations, risking assistance from the U.S. Congress. In addition, widespread government corruption, inefficiencies in the coordination of the anti-drug effort and a fractured political environment remain as significant obstacles to overcoming the current crisis. Now more than ever, the Mexican government and its political parties must come together and form a common front to effectively contain this national security emergency.

Strategic interests in the U.S.-Mexican partnership are not new, and neither are the problems they face together, but past obstacles have prevented these two countries from taking the necessary steps to foster a truly intimate relationship.  President Bush attempted to prioritize Mexico early in his presidency, but after September 11^th, 2001, Mexico fell to the back burner.   U.S. attention at that point turned towards the Middle East, where it has funneled large amounts of funding and resources for the past eight years.  It was not until recently, when Mexican drug violence began spilling north of the border, that U.S. attention turned back towards Mexico.  The U.S., rather than tackle this issue preemptively, waited until the violence and corruption got so out of control that there was a desperate need for attention.  According to Pamela Starr, Mexicans harvested feelings of disappointment and neglect towards their northern neighbor during those eight years of neglect, and by the end of the Bush administration, much of Mexico no longer trusted the U.S. government.  With the election of Barack Obama, however, Mexico has a renewed sense of trust in the U.S. government, and there is a unique window of opportunity to create a new, stronger relationship between these historic partners.

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have capitalized on this window of opportunity and made promising visits to Mexico in the past few months. In meeting with Mexican officials and President Calderón, their rhetoric accurately reflected the need for greater U.S. responsibility in Mexico’s war on drugs.  Their words also supported the need for a more intimate relationship between the two countries, and both officials were well received by the Mexican public.  The relationship between the U.S. and Mexico, however, is too important to survive on rhetoric alone.  Though President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s visits were a step in the right direction, the fact remains that both the U.S. and Mexico can and should push beyond recent rhetoric to foster a more intimate partnership unlike anything they have ever seen before.

We do not believe that there are one, two or even three major policies that can create the level of cooperation and intimacy we desire for the U.S.-Mexican relationship.  Rather, we believe that a series of small, short-term steps towards greater long-term goals will jump start better relations between the two countries on these crucial issues.  For the U.S., these steps are small, yet symbolic ways to reduce the flow of assault weapons into Mexico, increase border patrol of gun trafficking, and evaluate U.S. policies and programs regarding drug demand.  For Mexico, the measures we suggest are significant steps that must be taken in the domestic political arena to ensure a cohesive plan of action for the three major parties in Mexican politics. These steps will help to correct some of the obstacles faced by the Mexican state in its fight for stability and rule of law by reducing military desertion, government corruption, human rights abuses, inefficiencies in the coordination of counter-narcotic efforts and continuity of national security policy. At the same time, this will help to push Mexico closer to the U.S. and create a more intimate relationship.

We hope that both governments seriously consider our recommendations to not only secure their own national interests, but also take this unique opportunity to forge ahead in an unparalleled partnership with a strategic friend and ally.

MEMORANDUM

TO: President Barack Obama and President Felipe Calderón

CC (U.S.):  Secretary Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, Department of Health and Human Services, Attorney General Eric Holder, Department of Justice

CC (MEXICO):  Jesus Ortega Martinez, President: Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD); Beatriz Paredes Rangel, President: Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); German Martinez, President: Partido Accion Nacional (PAN)

FROM: The Bi-National Task Force: Victor Huerta Velasco and Hilary A. Tone

DATE: May 11, 2009

SUBJECT: Putting Words into Action – The Next Steps for the U.S. and Mexico

Before articulating our specific policy recommendations, we will address the policy currently shaping the U.S.-Mexican relationship, the Mérida Initiative, and evaluate its effectiveness to illustrate how and why our small steps to increased cooperation are crucial at this point in time.

I. THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE

WHAT IS IT?

Announced on October 22, 2007, and signed into law by President Bush on June 27, 2008, the Mérida Initiative is a bilateral security agreement focused on the United States and Mexico, and includes Central America and two Caribbean states.  The initiative is a three-year security agreement that aims to counter drug trafficking and criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as in the countries of Central America. Since Mexico is currently the main transit point for narcotics entering the U.S, the priority in the agreement is implementing improved security measures along the southern border of the U.S. The Initiative provides $1.4 billion in security assistance to the governments of Mexico and Central America with the bulk of the aid going to Mexico. The U.S. funds will help the latter governments enhance their ability to fight criminal organizations and drug trafficking by providing technical assistance and sophisticated equipment to their military and police forces, and training and technical advice for military, judicial and law enforcement officials. In addition, as requested by Congress, the U.S. will earmark a proportion of the funds to help develop and reform judicial institutions and to condition 15% of the funds aimed at the Mexican military and police upon review of human rights records.[1]

ORIGINS OF THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE

The Mérida Initiative is an unprecedented agreement in the history of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Mexico. The agreement became necessary given the changes in the international drug distribution channels in the 1990s. In addition, its ratification was only possible due to many years of increasing cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico in security issues and particularly in counter-narcotics efforts.  The initiative was warranted in 2007 given both the sharp rise in violence, attacks against the state and instability in Mexico and the recognition of the tremendous efforts to counter this rising crime by Mexico’s president, Felipe Calderón.

THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN CARTELS

In the beginning of the 1990s, a multi-year effort by the U.S. and the Colombian government was finally coming to fruition. In the U.S., law enforcement officials effectively shut down the cocaine transit route of the Caribbean and South Florida. At the same time, the Colombian security forces began scoring major successes against the Medellin and Cali Cartels, which had dominated the cocaine industry throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. This increased pressure on the Colombian cartels had the unintended consequence of strengthening Mexican criminal organizations. As noted on a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to Congress in 2008, “During the 1990s, two of the primary Colombian cartels, the Medellín and Cali Cartels controlled or influenced as much as 70% of cocaine shipped into North America; now Mexican cartels control approximately 90%” [2] As the importance of the Caribbean-South Florida transit route began to wane, so did the power and strength of the Colombian Cartels. The smaller organizations that remained following the successful destruction of the Cali and Medellin Cartels by the Colombian government were muscled out of the drug distribution and became producers and suppliers for the Mexican Cartels. [3] By controlling 90% of the cocaine distribution into the U.S., in addition to their control over heroin and marijuana distribution, the Mexican Cartels gained enormous economic power.  These trends were only exacerbated following successful policies by the Uribe administration in Colombia and the implementation of the Plan Colombia, a multi-year counter-narcotic security assistance package developed by the Clinton administration. According to the State Department, while 50% of the cocaine entering the U.S. in 2003 came from Mexico, the number had jumped to 90% by 2007, as noted above. [4]

In addition to the enormous increase in cocaine traffic coming into the U.S. through Mexico, both heroin and methamphetamine traffic increased markedly. According to a GAO report, heroin production in Mexico increased from nine tons in 2000 to 17 tons in 2005, an increase of nearly 100 percent. At the same time, methamphetamine seizures along the U.S. border saw a fivefold increase—from approximately 500 kilograms in 2000 to 2,900 kilograms in 2004 and 2,700 kilograms in 2006.[5]

By 2005, it had become clear that the Mexican cartels were the major players in the drug trafficking business and their growing power was of increasing concern to both the U.S. and Mexican governments. The shifting of the cocaine trafficking to Mexico and the overall increase in drug shipments into the U.S. from Mexico motivated the U.S. to consider assistance programs to help Mexico counter drug-related crime and trafficking.  For these reasons, the U.S. and Mexico began to cooperate much more closely under the Zedillo and Fox administrations.

U.S.-MEXICO COUNTER NARCOTIC COOPERATION PRIOR TO 2006

In the years prior to the Zedillo administration, Mexico was adamant about keeping its counternarcotics efforts isolated from U.S. cooperation.  This policy was a remnant of nationalism and acute sensitivities to its sovereignty, which had been a by-product of the historical interaction between the U.S. and Mexico. However, in recent years this policy has shifted towards increasing cooperation with the U.S. As a result of the rapid economic integration through NAFTA, Mexico began to see the U.S. as a potential partner in previously unthinkable areas of foreign policy. Coupled with this, the increased power of the Mexican drug cartels prompted Mexico to be more open to security cooperation with the U.S. Beginning in the 1990s, the Mexican government increased its security engagement with the U.S., which culminated in the signing of a Bi-National Drug Control Strategy in 1998 under the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000).[6] This treaty was followed by increased cooperation through the U.S.-Mexico Senior Law Enforcement Plenary.

This level of cooperation increased further under the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) as the U.S. began to provide increasing amounts of security assistance to Mexico. Between FY2000 and FY2006, the U.S. transferred approximately $397 million to support Mexican counternarcotics efforts. Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agencies were working closely in sharing intelligence, and Mexico began to extradite criminals wanted in the U.S. for the first time. At the same time, the militaries of both countries began working together to provide training and strengthen the capacity of the Mexican military to detect, interdict and monitor drug-trafficking aircraft and ships. From 2000 to 2006, the Department of Defense spent a total of approximately $58 million for equipment and training of the Mexican military and its navy in particular.[7] This cooperation and assistance was crucial in improving relations between the armed forces of the U.S. and Mexico. The success of these defense initiatives was evident in the increased cooperation between the Mexican Navy and its U.S. counter part. For example, in 2006 the Mexican Navy responded 46 times to U.S. information about suspicious ships. It also agreed to place Mexican officers in the U.S. Coast Guard and to allow dock searches and post-seizure analyses by U.S. law enforcement officials.[8]

This heightened level of cooperation between both governments was explicitly evident in the recent formation of the Southwest Border Strategy, aimed at reducing the flow of narcotics into the U.S. through Mexico. The creation of this strategy was highly receptive to comments and observations from Mexican officials. As noted by the GAO report in 2007, “We recommended that the Director of ONDCP, as the lead agency for U.S. drug policy, in conjunction with the cognizant departments and agencies in the U.S.  counter narcotics interagency community, coordinate with the appropriate Mexican officials before completing the Southwest Border Strategy’s implementation plant to help ensure Mexico’s cooperation with any efforts that require it and address the cooperation issues we identified.”[9] Cleary, the U.S. and Mexico had come a long way in their level of cooperation to combat narcotics. Mexico had made important steps to reduce its acute nationalism and concerns over sovereignty. It realized the need for U.S. assistance to effectively counter the rising power of the drug cartels and was open to defense and security cooperation. For its part, the U.S. overcame its paternalistic and unilateral approach to counter narcotic policy and accepted that any efficient anti-drug strategy necessitated the commitment of Mexican authorities.  By 2007 both governments were open to bilateral cooperation in security matters. A spike in violence coupled with assertive actions by Mexico’s government would result in the creation of the Mérida Initiative.

RISING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO, 2003 – PRESENT

 “It’s a real fight, it is a war”[10]. With these words Mexican President Felipe Calderón described the situation endured in Mexico throughout 2008, which counted 5,700 violent deaths, more than all the U.S. casualties in Iraq. Considering the military weapons used by the cartels to fight the government forces and the number of deaths since 2006, which number more than 10,000, Mexico really is in a state of war. Violence in Mexico has risen consistently since 2003. In that year, the Fox administration began to attack the Gulf Cartel in Nuevo Laredo. Government actions began to weaken the cartel and motivated an opportunistic move by the rival Sinaloa Cartel to enter Nuevo Laredo. This gave rise to a violent turf war between the cartels that has been one of the factors in the escalating violence.

As Felipe Calderón began his administration in 2006, he vowed to check the growing power of the drug cartels and deployed the army and federal police to ‘hot-spots’ in the country. This additional disruption to their business caused the cartels to lash out and become ever more violent. At the same time, the capture of cartel leaders increased the turf wars between the cartels and consequently created a rise in deaths of police, military and cartel-related criminals. To protect their business, the cartels created enforcer arms of highly trained and heavily armed individuals tasked with protecting shipments, transit routes, and assassinating police, government officials and opposing cartel members. The most notorious of these are the Zetas, from the Gulf Cartel, and the Negros, from the Sinaloa Cartel. The head of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas, organized the Zetas in the late 1990s by recruiting deserting elements of the Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE) a special operations unit of the Mexican military trained in anti-narcotics operations with U.S. assistance. Their sophisticated training, tactics and weaponry and their brutal actions pushed the intensity of the violence in Mexico to unprecedented levels. The Negros are a similar group formed by the Sinaloa Cartel in response to the sophistication and firepower of the Zetas.

In addition to the sharp intensification of violence, Mexico was for the first time becoming a drug consuming country. In the past, during the PRI administrations, drug trafficking was seen largely as a U.S. problem since there was no demand in Mexico. As a result of greater interdiction efforts on the U.S. border by the Zedillo administration in response to U.S. pressures and by U.S. Border Agencies, the drug cartels began to create a domestic drug market. At the same time, economic growth in Mexico created increasing demand for narcotics. This problem has grown exponentially in recent years and is a fundamental factor that motivated the Mexican government to increase its efforts to fight drug cartels. These developments and the spreading of violence motivated the Mexican government to overlook its sensitivities and seek assistance from the U.S. to control the rising instability and violence in Mexico.

U.S. MOTIVATIONS

In addition to the drastic need to help Mexico sustain its fight against the drug cartels, the Bush administration had a variety of reasons to push for the Mérida Initiative. His administration viewed the Mérida Initiative as an opportunity to cement deeper ties to Mexico and to correct the imbalance in U.S. policy that arose from the 9/11 attacks, which shifted U.S. attention to the Middle East and created resentment in Latin America. In addition, it would potentially help improve the relationship with Mexico and Central America following the strains caused by the lack of immigration reform. [11]

THE RIGHT MOMENT: FELIPE CALDERÓN

In response to the escalating violence resulting from his direct confrontation of the cartels, Felipe Calderón recognized the increasing threats to the Mexican state from the drug cartels and indicated that combating the illicit trade of narcotics with U.S. cooperation would be a priority.[12] The administration of Felipe Calderón had taken unprecedented steps to fight the power of the drug cartels and was highly praised by U.S. officials in 2006 and 2007. At the same time Calderón communicated his government’s intent to work closely with the U.S. in combating the drug trafficking organizations since his visit in November 2006 to Washington, before being initiated as President. Given the historic Mexican mistrust for the U.S., Calderón took significant political risk when reaching out to the Bush administration for increased assistance in the March 2007 Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Mérida. In general, U.S. government officials recognized the significance of the unprecedented cooperation by Felipe Calderón. As noted in a report to members of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate titled The Mérida Initiative: Drugs, Guns and Friends: “The Mérida Initiative represents a rare opportunity to build a base for sustained cooperation with Mexico on a shared agenda. To pass on this opportunity would represent a significant blunder that would have a negative impact on the bilateral relationship, as well as broader U.S. interests in the region.” [13] Clearly, the efforts made by Felipe Calderón in showing relentless commitment to the fight against drug cartels and receiving U.S. aid were fundamental in pushing for the Mérida Initiative.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE

The Mérida Initiative lays the groundwork for deeper cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico and, if successful, is likely to divert the drug traffic routes to alternate geographic areas. This security initiative has already pushed both the U.S. and Mexican governments to new heights in their openness to cooperate and understand the necessity for a strong partnership in facing the challenges posed by drug trafficking. As an international problem and given the level of U.S.-Mexico integration, drug cartels pose a security threat to both countries. The Mérida Initiative is significant not only in that it hopes to address this issue but also in the fact that it has led both countries to recognize that it must be fought together.

In addition to deepening U.S.-Mexico ties, the increased interdiction efforts by the Mexican government with U.S. assistance are likely to divert the drug traffic, and its implications for violence and instability, to other regions. Many scholars and analysts compare the drug trade to a water balloon: If it is squeezed in one place it will bulge out in a different area. As long as the demand for narcotics is not checked in the U.S., drug traffic will adapt and persist. Evidence of this is already visible.  There is no doubt that the efforts by the Mexican government have yielded results in drug interdiction. Increased surveillance of aircraft entering the Mexican airspace and maritime trafficking have decreased the airborne shipments of cocaine from Colombia by 95 percent and the seaborne shipments by more than 60 percent. This has created a need for land routes through Central America, increasing its geographic importance and the presence of cartel violence in that region. In addition, Mexican cartels have begun to increase their operations in South America, to sell drugs in those markets and to ship them to European markets. [14] Other analysts are speculating that the increased interdiction in Mexico and the U.S.-Mexico border are suggesting a shift to sea routes through the Caribbean with Venezuela playing a more significant role in trafficking. As noted in a 2008 report by the CRS: “According to the State Department drug smuggling flights from Venezuela to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, presumably in transit to the U.S., increased 167% in 2006 and 33% in 2007. Some also suggest that cocaine flows may also further shift toward Europe, with Brazil as a transit point.”[15] Clearly, if the Mérida Initiative continues its successful interdiction it will have the unintended consequence of diverting the drug flows to other regions in the Western Hemisphere.

II.  MÉRIDA INITIATIVE PREMISES, AIMS, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS

President Calderón’s request for assistance was unprecedented in U.S.-Mexican relations.  As Mexico’s drug violence spiraled out of control, Calderón realized the need for drastic action and brought his concerns to the U.S. According to Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon, the Mérida Initiative was indeed born out of crisis in Mexico, but it also provided the U.S. with a strategic opportunity.  This policy, therefore, was not just focused on the U.S. giving Mexico the assistance it requested; it was meant to be a joint strategy between two countries that would allow for greater cooperation and ultimately, alleviate drug violence problems on both sides of the border.  Mérida was therefore founded upon the idea that the U.S. was not only capable of helping Mexico, but also capable of taking responsibility for its own contributions in Mexico’s war on drugs.  The central premise for such a cooperative strategy is that helping Mexico fight the illegal drug trade will ultimately curb supply and demand for drugs in the U.S.

In broad terms, the Mérida Initiative aims to improve efforts in three areas for the U.S. and Mexico: 1) counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and border security, 2) public security and law enforcement and 3) institution building and rule of law.  More specifically, this policy aims for measurable goals such as reducing the flow of drugs into the U.S. and dismantling major drug trafficking cartels.  Mérida also aims to deny drug traffickers, narco-terrorists and their criminal associates profits through money laundering activities.  Given the rampant corruption in Mexican law enforcement and its transitioning judicial system (from inquisitorial to adversarial), this policy further intends to strengthen Mexican governance and law enforcement institutions.  On the Mexican side, Mérida’s aims provide a rather comprehensive strategy for the Mexican sectors most in need of assistance to fight drug trafficking and its resulting violence. In accordance with the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government agreed to increase its efforts in four main areas. As the U.S. Congress implements security assistance to Mexico, it will pay particular attention to the actions taken by the Mexican government and its progress in the following: (1) Domestic counterdrug efforts, (2) police reform and anti-corruption efforts, (3) implementation of judicial reforms, and (4) protection of human rights. In 2009 alone, Mexico has pledged over $5 billion in its security budget to meet Mérida’s goals, according to Mary Stickles, a political officer at the Mexico desk at the Department of State.

The U.S. portion of this policy, however, is much less comprehensive and specific.  In the 33 pages detailing the Mérida Initiative, a mere five pages are devoted to U.S. responsibility.  Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson claims that the three areas in which Mexico most needs U.S. cooperation are reductions in drug demand, the southbound flow of arms, and bulk cash smuggling.  Following with such logic, Mérida also emphasizes these three areas and designates them as “support activities” in Title IV.  The policy does little else to indicate what specific steps the U.S. should take in order to not only assist Mexico, but more importantly, secure its national interests with its southern neighbor.

The original amount President Bush requested for this policy was $1.4 billion over three years.  Congress, however, has cut the requested funding in the past two fiscal year budgets.  According to Deputy Assistant Secretary Jacobson, Congress cut the budget by $100 million in FY 2008, and by $150 million in FY 2009, meaning that the U.S. has only approved $750 million instead of $950 million in two years.  Jacobson claims that these cuts will not allow the policy to realize its goals, and the State Department may even look to extend Mérida into the FY 2011 budget in order to fully fund the originally requested amount.  Though the Department of State is in charge of implementing and leading Mérida, the policy requires cooperation from several U.S. agencies – the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco, USAID, SOUTHCOM and the FBI.  It is therefore an inter-agency initiative and by nature, requires more time to move through the bureaucracy, which is “very slow,” according to Jennie Muñoz, a staffer for Congresswoman Nita Lowey.

Though Mérida has admirable goals for both countries, there have been a number of inefficiencies.  Although the U.S. has increased its efforts to intercept the flow of weapons to Mexico since 2006, this has been largely ineffective. Prior to the Mérida Initiative, the ATF dedicated approximately 100 agents for Project Gunrunner. These agents were charged with overseeing approximately 6,700 gun stores located along the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition, it launched a bilateral program to counter the smuggling of high caliber weapons called Armas Cruzadas. At the same time it implemented eTrace, a firearms tracking technology to U.S. consulates in Mexico, which has helped in arms trafficking investigations. Nevertheless, these programs have been insufficient. U.S. officials claim that between 90% and 95% of the traced weapons seized in Mexico came from the U.S.[16] Currently, about 2,000 weapons flow into Mexico each day.[17] One of the reasons that weapons are so difficult to interdict is that the smuggling of arms into Mexico is done by multiple individuals carrying small amounts of guns at a time, known as the “parade of ants.”  As of March 24, 2009, in accordance with the U.S.-Mexico Border Security Policy announcement in the White House, the U.S. will continue these programs and increase their funding and manpower. [18]  Whether this will be able to correct the inefficiencies of the past two years remains to be seen.

Overall, the Mérida Initiative seems like it could have long-term potential as an aid package for Mexico with adequate funding and resources.  In the words of Texas Representative Henry Cuellar, however, “The Merida Initiative is not an aid package but a joint cooperative strategy between two nations.”[19]  As a joint cooperation strategy between the U.S. and Mexico, therefore, this policy is clearly ineffective and inefficient.  The escalating violence on both sides of the border further illustrates its ineffectiveness: more than 7,000 people have died since January of 2008, and ATF claims that nearly 1,000 Mexican people died as a result of drug violence in just the first two months of 2009.  The violence has now spread over the U.S. border into several southwestern cities (such as Tucson, San Diego and El Paso), and drug-related activity is present in over 300 US cities.  The U.S. supplies 90% of the arms confiscated yearly in Mexico according to Congressional legislation (including the Mérida Initiative), ATF’s National Tracing Center, and the Violence Policy Center.  These arms provide the means for drug cartels to intimidate law enforcement and civilians, as well as take innocent lives, and the U.S. has not yet taken any steps to reduce the flow of arms south.  At the root of this crisis is the U.S. demand for drugs: U.S. citizens spend $65 billion per year on illegal narcotics, most of which come from or transit through Mexico.  Similar to arms flow, the U.S. has not yet taken significant steps to reduce drug demand, the problem fueling such high levels of violence, crime and corruption.

Given the vast difference in funding between the U.S. and Mexico, it is clear that Mérida does not create a balanced partnership.  The Mexican government is devoting much more to fighting drug trafficking than is the U.S., and it almost goes without saying that the U.S. needs to do more.  Overall, this policy falls short of fostering the intimate and truly cooperative relationship that these two countries could share.

III.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Many organizations and officials are calling for greater U.S. action in light of recent news on increased violence and crime as a result of drug trafficking.  The Washington Office on Latin America, for example, claims that Mérida focuses too much on hardware.  WOLA’s Director Joy Olson, in testifying before Congress, said that the U.S. should not spend so much money on equipment and communication technology, but rather, should prioritize other areas such police and justice reform, and creating measures to hold criminals accountable.  Other organizations like the Latin America Working Group call for the U.S. to withdraw its support for Mexico’s use of the military for public security.  LAWG’s Director Lisa Haugaard, in March 2009, stated before Congress that Mexico’s military use has resulted in gross human rights violations, and that the U.S. should attach further human rights conditions to aid packages to Mexico.  Other recommendations from senior level officials and Congress members call for such actions as a nationwide ban on assault weapons and greater drug rehabilitation and treatment programs.

As a Bi-National Task Force, we find these broad arguments unfitting and somewhat unrealistic for our policy purposes. Though they do carry some merit, they are insufficient at this point in time for our ultimate goal – unparalleled cooperation in the U.S. – Mexico partnership.  While it is true that the U.S. has not done enough to hold up its portion of the Mérida Initiative, and certainly true that U.S. drug demand is the most significant factor contributing to this crisis, the solution to drug trafficking and violence problems does not lie in U.S. domestic policy alone.  Rather, we believe that the U.S. and Mexico can best achieve a new level of intimacy and trust by embarking on a joint policy to complement the Mérida Initiative.  This policy consists of a series of small steps that both countries can take in order to secure their own national interests while simultaneously assisting each other in this transnational fight. These small steps, however, will not narcotize U.S.-Mexican relations; we intend for these steps to mold and strengthen the relationship for other crucial issues in the future.  In other words, the drug trafficking issue, though serious and urgent, provides the foundation for the U.S. and Mexico to work together in an unprecedented way, and presents a strategic opportunity for both countries to expedite cooperation and put recent rhetoric into policy. If implemented in the next two to three years, these small steps will result in our desired long-term goal for U.S.-Mexican relations: an intimate, cooperative relationship centered on immigration, trade and security.

FOR THE U.S.

There are five steps that the U.S. government should take to achieve this intimate level of cooperation with Mexico.  We believe that these steps are essential in order to protect U.S. interests and national security in the current crisis; in the words of Retired General Barry McCaffrey, “The U.S. cannot afford to have a narco state as a neighbor.”  Simultaneously, these steps will demonstrate U.S. willingness to work with Mexico on the drug trafficking issue without being too inflammatory or controversial for U.S. domestic considerations.  President Obama should publicly support our policy steps in order to draw media attention to the current state of drug trafficking and violence problems in the U.S., and therefore prioritize these steps in the necessary government agencies/bodies.

• 1)    Enforce the existing ban on importing assault weapons and expand import restrictions to include other “non-sporting” weapons currently trafficked into Mexico.
• 2)    Support S. 843, a Senate bill proposed to close the “gun show loophole” by requiring background checks for all guns sold at gun shows.
• 3)    Provide additional funding to send more ATF agents to patrol southwestern border gun shows as well as the approximately 6,700 U.S. gun dealers within a short drive of the border.
• 4)    Appoint a cabinet-level leader to coordinate U.S. cooperation at the federal, state and local levels for the new Southwest Border initiative, “The Way Ahead.”
• 5)    Support HR 2134, a House bill titled the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act, which will “create an independent commission to evaluate U.S. policies and programs aimed at reducing illicit drug supply and demand.”

1) Enforce the existing ban on importing assault weapons and expand import restrictions to include other “non-sporting” weapons currently trafficked into Mexico.

This step is by far the most intricate and potentially controversial.  Though these sections of analyses and considerations are quite lengthy and detailed, the remaining policy steps do not require the same level of cautious consideration and maneuver.

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

In 1989, President George H.W. Bush implemented a policy allowing ATF to exclude from importation all semiautomatic assault rifles as “non-sporting” weapons, as well as all assault weapons kits and parts sets.  George H.W. Bush implemented this policy in response to mass shootings in the U.S., and the Clinton administration further strengthened the import regulations in 1998.  According to the Violence Policy Center, however, the ban was “essentially abandoned by the George W. Bush administration.”[20]  Stricter policy enforcement, therefore, would stop or at least reduce the incoming flow of assault weapons favored by the Mexican drug cartels, including the popular AK-type rifles that have been confiscated in large numbers by Mexican authorities, namely the AK-15 and AK-47 rifles.  In addition, this existing law could also be used to restrict the importation of other “non-sporting” firearms frequently trafficked to Mexico.  These other weapons have been imported since the Bush administration “weakened the sporting purposes tests,” allowing for newer versions of assault AK-pistols and handguns.[21]  The most infamous of these handguns is the FN-Five-seveN handgun known as the “matapolicia” or “cop killer” because cartels have used them to kill law enforcement officers.

Gun control groups and organizations like the Violence Policy Center will argue that this policy step is not going to stem the flow of assault weapons into Mexico.  They will claim that nothing short of a nationwide ban on assault weapons will make a significant difference in the number of arms making their way into drug cartel possession. While these groups have valid points, we believe that this step is the key first step to reducing the flow of arms into Mexico.  Though its effects may not be seen or felt immediately, it would certainly be a symbolic move to illustrate U.S. willingness to cooperate with Mexico, especially in areas like arms control where the U.S. has admitted contributing to the problem.  In addition, we believe that this step, coupled with steps 2 and 3, would not only be a symbolic move on behalf of the U.S., but would begin to be effective once the gun show loophole is closed and increased ATF agents are assigned to border areas.  The benefit of this step is that it does not require a new policy or new legislation; it merely requires enforcing laws that already exist and expanding them to stop the importation of assault, “non-sporting” weapons used most frequently by the drug cartels.

The constraints for this step will likely be domestic opposition from gun lobbies and the National Rifle Association.  The NRA, specifically, has been adamantly opposed to significant revisions of US gun laws, arguing that even a small revision can lead to more and stricter policies to revoke certain freedoms given by the Second Amendment.  NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre, for example, recently posted a commentary on CNN claiming that Mexican drug cartels receive arms through a transnational black market, as opposed to in the U.S., because they are equipped with other weapons not sold in the U.S., such as hand grenades.  There is also Congressional opposition to revising US gun laws, evidenced by Congressman Mike Ross’s letter to Attorney General Eric Holder in March of 2009, asking him not to re-instate the Federal Assault Weapons Ban that expired in 2004.  Ross, a House democrat, sent the letter with 64 signatures from other House democrats, many of whom represent southwestern states.

The enforcement of an existing ban on the importation of assault weapons, however, is much less controversial than legislating a federal ban on all assault weapons in the U.S.  Our recommended policy step, therefore, would be a more feasible act because it would not run into as much domestic opposition.  The NRA and gun lobbies, currently, are more concerned by a possible re-instatement of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (as illustrated in Congressman Ross’s letter) and the possible repeal of the Tiahrt Amendment, which would make ATF gun trace data publicly available.[22]   As a result, this policy step, though it may ruffle a few feathers, will not likely run into severe opposition, especially since it is a step that the U.S. can take to ensure its own national security.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Expanding import restrictions to include other “non-sporting” weapons requires ATF action.  ATF should use the provisions of the existing law to restrict these other weapons, as well as strengthen the tests for “sporting purposes” that became lax during the Bush administration.  Specifically, ATF should aim to stop or at least reduce the imported flow of AK-type rifles like the AK-15 and AK-47 rifles, as well as the FN Five-seveN handgun (or “matapolicia”), which are most frequently used in cartel drug violence.  Greater enforcement of the existing law also requires ATF action in the form of increased agents and oversight in the border region.  The third policy step aims to fund such an increase, and will be addressed in its respective section.

In order to expedite implementation, President Obama should publicly support expanding restrictions on the existing import ban, and should frame this issue as a matter of national security, rather than gun control, to deter opposition from potential domestic opposition, namely the NRA and gun lobbies.  The key political consideration here, however, is the fear amongst U.S. citizens that President Obama seeks to significantly revise U.S. gun laws, or even take people’s guns away. Keeping that consideration in mind, it is crucial that the President takes care to frame the gun issue as a national security concern for both the U.S. and Mexico.  If he is able to successfully communicate the expanded restrictions as a matter of national interest that does not revoke additional gun freedoms, there should be few obstacles to implementing this policy.  The fact that he is not trying to re-instate the Federal Assault Weapons Ban or repeal the Tiahrt Amendment will work in his favor regarding this issue.  Additionally, gun control lobbies and outside organizations, such as the Violence Policy Center, should lobby Congress members to support this step.  They should draw media attention to this step to demonstrate how the U.S. is taking responsibility for its contributions to Mexico’s drug war, as well as how it is securing its own citizens.  We believe that implementing this first step will pave the way and garner support for stricter, more effective steps in the future, possibly even further legislation on restricting assault weapons in the U.S. if the step is implemented without significant obstacles.

2) Support S. 843, a Senate bill proposed to close the “gun show loophole” by requiring background checks for all guns sold at gun shows.

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

Thirty U.S. states do not require personal gun sellers at gun shows to conduct a background check on those who purchase their guns. Only those considered Federal Firearm Licensees (FFLs) are required to check a buyer’s background, and if the seller is not “engaged in the business” of selling firearms, they can sell personal weapons without background checks.  Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey claims that these non-licensees make up at least one quarter of firearm sellers at gun shows. Such practices allow people with criminal histories to easily buy weapons such as those used in cartel violence and mass shootings.  In order to close this “loophole” in legislation, Senator Lautenberg introduced the Gun Show Background Check Act of 2009 this past April.  This legislation has four objectives, which fit well with U.S. aims to reduce the southbound flow of arms, as well as make gun show transactions safer for all Americans:

1) Define gun shows as any event at which 50 or more firearms are exhibited or sold, including any events where firearms are not the main commodity, such as flea markets and swap meets.

2) Require all gun promoters to register with ATF, keep a list of all gun vendors, and ensure that vendors acknowledge receipt of information about their legal obligations.

3) Require all firearm sales at gun shows to go through an FFL.  Non-licensed sellers would need to use an FFL to complete the transaction, and FFLs would conduct background checks and keep records of the transaction.

4) Require all FFLs to submit relevant information, including manufacturer and model, to the ATF National Tracing Center without submitting personal information about either the seller or purchaser, unless that firearm becomes the subject of a law enforcement trace request.[23]

The domestic constraints for this step are similar to those discussed for the first step.  Most opposition will likely come from the NRA and gun lobbies who will claim that this step is an invasion of privacy as well as a way to create more government regulation on the right to bear arms.  The NRA website also claims that this bill would create “ludicrous” requirements for gun show customers and gun collectors, and that ultimately, the government hopes to run gun shows out of business.[24]  The basis for negotiation, however, is that this bill simply closes a loophole that cartels use to purchase arms without criminal background checks.  This bill is not such a far stretch from existing legislation, which already requires background checks for all other types of gun sales – it is simply requiring the same procedures for events where large quantities of firearms are on display or for sale.  Though the NRA is sure to raise somewhat of an opposition to this bill, it is likely that this bill would pass, especially considering such bi-partisan figures as Senator John McCain, Senator Joe Lieberman and President Obama support closing the loophole.  It is also similar to the first step in that it is a scaled-down, less inflammatory measure to help reduce the southbound flow of arms and further secure U.S. arm sales, as well as send a symbolic message to Mexico.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Unlike the first step, this policy step requires significant Congressional support.  Currently, Senator Lautenberg’s bill has 13 co-sponsors in the Senate, though it was only introduced a few weeks ago.  Lautenberg is hopeful that he will find more colleagues in both the Senate and the House to co-sponsor this bill, especially since he was able to pass a very similar bill in 1996 when both houses had a Republican, instead of a Democratic, majority.  Lautenberg will need to reach out to various members of both houses and both parties to pass this bill, and should especially garner the support of Congressional members from the southwestern states where violence is felt most heatedly.  Like the first step, gun control groups and reputable outside organizations like the Violence Policy Center should lobby Congress members for support; they should also highlight this bill in the media to draw more attention to the ways in which the U.S. is protecting its citizens while simultaneously responding to its responsibility in Mexico’s war on drugs.

Gun control advocates consider President Obama an ally of this cause, and expect him to sign this bill into law should it pass the Congress.[25]  Though it is still true that President Obama has the same key political consideration for this step as the previous one, this policy is again a less controversial, scaled-down measure to help reduce the illegal flow of arms into Mexico.  It resembles nothing close to a federal ban on all assault weapons or the repeal of the Tiahrt Amendment, so it will likely be easier to sell to the Congressional bodies needed to support this bill.  Once again, President Obama should publicly support this bill and use it to push for increased security in U.S. arms sales.  Such an emphasis will not only help to incrementally improve violence in Mexico, but more importantly, will reassure the American people that its national security is protected against criminals illegally purchasing weapons.  The President should, again, frame his support in this light as to not arouse opposition from the vocal lobbies who may rise against this bill.

3) Provide additional funding to send more ATF agents to patrol southwestern border gun shows as well as the approximately 6,700 U.S. gun dealers within a short drive of the border.

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

This step is fairly straightforward and simple, but it is crucial for the combined success of all five steps.  It would be unwise to expect either of the first two steps to be implemented effectively without increased funding for ATF.  According to Pamela Starr, much of what the U.S. currently needs to do is enforce existing laws, as mentioned in the first step.  The problem, however, is that there are not enough ATF agents present in the border region to regulate and enforce those laws.  This step, therefore, aims to send more ATF personnel and resources to the border region to not only patrol border crossings, but also southwestern-area gun shows and the approximately 6,700 U.S. gun dealers that are “within a short drive of the border.”[26]  Though many gun dealers take care to report suspicious “straw” gun purchases (people without criminal backgrounds who purchase weapons for those who do), some do not comply with ATF and do not report suspicious activity, meaning that the dealers simply look the other way.

The good news for this step is that it already appears that the Obama administration is moving in this direction, meaning it would be much easier to implement this step as well as avoid potential constraints. In March, President Obama pledged $700 million to improve Mexican law enforcement and crime prevention efforts.[27] He announced that the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security would develop this new federal plan with hopes of doubling the number of agents there, and moving other agents, equipment and resources to the border.  In response, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano has announced a new border security initiative called “The Southwest Border: The Way Ahead.”  This initiative increases collaboration between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and relies heavily on the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST), which is directed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and works with Mexican officials.[28]  Napolitano is also doubling the number of ICE agents on the BEST teams.

Though these plans certainly pave the way for increased ATF oversight and presence, DOJ has announced the sending of only 100 additional ATF agents to the border since these plans were created.[29]  Such a number pales in comparison to the roughly 2,000 miles of border in the southwestern region.  In order to further beef up this area and better patrol the flow of firearms across the border, ATF will need increased funding for more personnel and more resources, which would amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.  Likely constraints for this funding will come from Congressional appropriations committees who have already allocated millions of dollars for border security over the past several years, especially through the Mérida Initiative.  It is clear, however, given the thousands of miles of border area and the 6,700 gun dealers within that stretch that an additional 100 ATF agents is insufficient.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In order to receive more ATF funding, President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder will need to convince four key Congressional subcommittees of the need for increased resources and personnel.  Two of those subcommittees are the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies as well as the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Related Agencies.  These committees are responsible for funding DOJ bureaus such as ATF, and without their support, it is unlikely that ATF will receive adequate resources to establish a stronger presence in the border region.  In these subcommittees, however, there are six members from southwestern states.  These Representatives and Senators will likely be open to funding more ATF agents since it will increase security for their states; Obama and Holder should use those six members’ support to get a foot in the door with the rest of the subcommittee members.  In addition, President Obama and Attorney General Holder will need to convince the subcommittees currently funding the Mérida Initiative of the need for increased funding for border security, since this policy step is a direct result of Mérida’s shortcomings.  It is therefore crucial that the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs are involved in the funding process for this step.

Funding requests for this purpose, fortunately, will already have an advantage in the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs.  Its chairwoman, Congresswoman Nita Lowey, strongly supports more funding for Mexico and border issues.  Jennie Muñoz, Lowey’s staffer who covers the Mérida Initiative in her office, claims that after Lowey’s recent delegation visit to Mexico, she is convinced of the need to channel more funding to coordinated efforts on both sides of the border.  Having Lowey’s support for more ATF funding would be a strong advantage in requesting additional funds because she would likely be able to garner support among her colleagues in other subcommittees. According to Mary Stickles at the State Department, visiting Congressional delegations to Mexico have been an effective way of convincing them of the need for more funding.  Therefore, it is necessary for more Congressional delegations from all four of these subcommittees to visit Mexico and the border area during the next recess to understand the need for increased ATF resources and become advocates for additional funding in the region.  If they can see the encouraging start that the U.S. and Mexico have made in these efforts, they are more likely to follow through with the promise the U.S. made to Mexico through the Mérida Initiative to increase border security and improve the tracking of arms flow across the border.

There are no serious political considerations to speak of for this step since there has been no notable opposition to increased U.S. border security in the past.  President Obama keeps with previous policies by pushing for greater ATF presence, though he should emphasize that new ATF agents will not be responsible for the same practices as before.  Rather, they will be in place to oversee and secure the first two steps of this policy to ensure that firearm laws are enforced, gun shows are regulated, and that non-compliant dealers within the border region report suspicious straw purchases.  By sending more ATF agents to the region to enforce the first two steps, Obama is not only sending symbolic messages to Mexico regarding U.S. arms law and regulation, but that he is taking tangible action to enforce these cooperative steps.

4) Appoint a cabinet-level leader to coordinate U.S. cooperation at the federal, state and local levels for the new Southwest Border initiative, “The Way Ahead.”

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

Secretary Napolitano’s new border initiative is a step in the right direction, but the naming of a new “border czar” to oversee U.S. Customs and Border Protection is a bit ambiguous and potentially confusing.  The border czar, Alan Bersin, will be responsible for overseeing the interception of drugs and illegal immigrants at all entrances to the U.S., as well as allowing the legal flow of goods and traffic.  His position is undoubtedly important for the success of the initiative, but the potentially confusing and problematic part is that this initiative requires cooperation at the federal, state and local levels, and such cooperation must begin at the senior level.  The purpose in appointing a cabinet-level leader of “The Way Ahead,” and therefore restructuring who’s in charge, is to designate a single senior official who can appeal to the heads of other agencies, thus facilitating cooperation at the top.  Then, hopefully, such cooperation will trickle down to the appropriate agencies and ensure successful implementation and execution of this initiative.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This is perhaps the simplest step to implement because it requires a single action from President Obama with little political consideration or domestic constraints.  He must appoint a leader within the cabinet, likely Secretary Napolitano, to be the designated head of this initiative who has the authority to bring concerns and appeals directly to other important officials, such as Attorney General Holder, whose agencies’ cooperation are necessary to carry out this initiative.  This step would likely go unopposed by the public because it is a necessary organizational move to maintain cooperation in a bureaucratic system.  The government agencies involved would not be required to do any additional work, but rather, keep contact with fellow agencies and work with them from the top-down, so it is likely that they would not raise opposition either.  Overall, this is a simple but necessary step within the U.S. government to ensure that border security with Mexico is done efficiently and cooperatively, and it would show the Mexican government that the U.S. is taking logical steps to increase its border initiatives’ efficiency.

5) Support HR 2134, a House bill titled the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act, which will “create an independent commission to evaluate U.S. policies and programs aimed at reducing illicit drug supply and demand.”

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

Though the previous four steps address small ways to reduce the southbound flow of arms and increase border oversight and security, it would be unwise to ignore the issue of U.S. demand for drugs.  As mentioned earlier in this memo, U.S. drug demand is at the root of Mexico’s violent drug trafficking.  U.S. residents spend $65 billion per year on illegal narcotics, and in such a lucrative industry, it is no wonder that drug trafficking violence, crime and corruption has spiraled out of control.  Because “reducing drug demand” is such a long-term goal, however, this policy step is more of a bite-sized way to begin address the overwhelming issue of U.S. drug demand.

Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, introduced the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2009 to “create an independent commission to evaluate U.S. policies and programs aimed at reducing illicit drug supply and demand.”[30]  This policy aims to find out what works and what does not work in order to tackle the U.S. drug problem, calling on Congress members to support this bill because our partners in the Americas “deserve no less.”[31]  This bill is a bi-partisan effort, which means there will be fewer domestic constraints.  In addition, it aims to alleviate an issue that most Americans consider problematic or dangerous in the U.S.  A 2007 Gallup Poll indicated that over 70% of Americans consider the nation’s drug problem “very serious.”[32]  Given the recent media coverage on the violent drug trafficking problems on both sides of the border, and given U.S. senior officials who have openly admitted U.S. responsibility for fueling those problems through demand, that percentage is sure to have increased in the past few months.  Therefore, Congress members would support this bill since their constituencies would likely favor this first step in reducing U.S. drug demand and ensuring U.S. security against illegal narcotics.

The fact that this bill is bi-partisan and does not deal with a very divisive issue also eliminates much of the potential domestic constraints.  For those Congress members who support drug legalization, however, this bill is still not inflammatory because it only seeks to evaluate U.S. programs and policies, rather than try to force illegalization methods.   It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Engel’s bill will gain the necessary support to pass and create the independent commission.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Like most of the other steps, Engel will need to garner Congressional support from his colleagues.  The bill already has 12 co-sponsors from both political parties, and it is credible because Engel is the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.  This subcommittee has dealt with the Mérida Initiative quite closely over the past few years, so it comes as no surprise that Engel saw the need for such a commission.  The representative can use his knowledge from that subcommittee to encourage other Congress members to support what he considers a serious threat to the U.S. and to Mexico.  It would also behoove Engel to target members of Health and Human Services Subcommittees to support this bill since they deal specifically with U.S. drug demand.  Fortunately, there is evidence that Engel is already doing so: Nita Lowey is a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Health and Human Services, and she received Engel’s invitation to co-sponsor this bill just one day after it was introduced.[33] Such invitations are an effective way to spread the word about a bill, and he should continue using such tactics.  In addition, if Engel can gain public support from Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary for Health and Human Services, as well as find outside, non-governmental health organizations to push Congressional support, he will more likely see this bill come to fruition.

This bill will also need significant media attention, and should be seen as an effective way to secure the U.S. from rampant drug use and examine the U.S. role in Mexico’s war on drugs.  Because of the recent media coverage on the drug war, this issue is a hot topic at the moment and likely one that would be prioritized.  The bill would also benefit from President Obama’s public support.  Both Secretary Clinton and President Obama have publicly admitted to U.S. responsibility regarding drug demand, so it is likely that the President would sign this bill to stay consistent with his message to the American people as well as to Mexico.

MEXICAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. ACTIONS

Because this policy consists of domestic steps that the U.S. can take, there is no need to assess Mexican political considerations since these steps do not require Mexican action.  If anything, these steps will likely improve, even if only slightly, the urgent situation with drug trafficking violence and crime on both sides of the border.  It is, however, reasonable to speculate as to how Mexico will react to these steps if the U.S. is able to implement them effectively.

A Reforma poll in April 2009 found that 65 percent of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. president.  In addition, many news sources (including Pamela Starr’s blog) have reported that Secretary Clinton was well received on her visit to Mexico in March. President Calderón also publicly stated in March that the U.S. has a serious responsibility regarding drug traffic.  Furthermore, Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora recently claimed that his three highest priorities for Mexico were “guns, guns, guns.”[34]  It seems likely, therefore, that Mexican public opinion and the Mexican government would favor these five policy steps because they target U.S. arms flow and drug demand.  They are tangible, concrete actions that begin to address, in a small way, the ways in which the U.S. can take responsibility for its contributions to drug trafficking and correct its wrongs.  Mexico would also favor these steps because it demonstrates how the U.S. can push beyond simple rhetoric and actually begin to legislate its promises.  Especially since the U.S. has not adequately upheld its obligations under the Mérida Initiative, Mexico is likely to appreciate U.S. attempts to account for its shortcomings, even if the actions are only symbolic or make but a small difference.

WHAT NOW?

The U.S. needs to take specific courses of action to ensure that these policy steps are implemented in the next two to three years.  If these actors follow the necessary steps outlined the previous sections, the U.S. and Mexico will reach an unparalleled level of cooperation in the history of its partnership.  This section will detail what specific actors should do as soon as possible, hopefully in the next three months, as well as subsequent steps to take in the next one to two years in order to achieve an intimate partnership.

FIRST ROUND OF ACTION

President Obama

The U.S. President should publicly announce and support this new policy and the implementation of all five components.  In addition to addressing how this policy will secure U.S. national interests and foster a better relationship with a strategic partner (Mexico), it is critical that President Obama show his support for each of these five steps.  With a public announcement at such a crucial point in time for these two countries, we hope that this policy will gain immediate media attention so that the media will provide coverage of this policy as the five steps are implemented.

In addition, President Obama should appoint his cabinet-level leader of the new border security initiative, “The Way Ahead,” as soon as possible.  This initiative has been announced and is already in progress.  The sooner President Obama can designate a cabinet member to coordinate federal, state and local cooperation from the top-down, the sooner this initiative can be more effective, and the sooner Mexico will see that the U.S. is taking swift and concrete actions to address its responsibility north of the border.

Gun Control & Health Groups, Lobbies, and NGOs

It is essential that gun control and health groups as well as outside organizations dedicated to both causes lobby members of Congress to support the first, second and fifth steps to this policy.  We hope to get both the gun show loophole bill and the independent drug policy commission bill passed through Congress well before the 2010 elections, so it is imperative that lobbies move quickly to garner support in both Houses.  They should focus their lobbying especially on representatives and Senators from southwestern Border States, and for gun control, use Senator McCain’s, Senator Lieberman’s and President Obama’s support as evidence for why it is necessary to close the loophole.  For the drug policy commission, groups should emphasize the bi-partisan nature of this bill and Engel’s experience dealing with Mérida’s consequences as a result of U.S. drug demand.  If these measures can pass before election campaigns are significantly underway, it would help to eliminate the overly cautious nature of Congress members that is typical around re-election season.

Congress Members

The two members responsible for the bills, specifically, need to take immediate action to garner support from fellow colleagues and Congress members.  Both Senator Lautenberg and Representative Engel should reach out for not only support of their bills, but names to add to the co-sponsor list.  Again, Lautenberg and Engel should focus their efforts especially on representatives from southwestern Border States where the effects of drug violence are most keenly felt.  They should use their knowledge and experience with gun control and drug demand, respectively, as a basis for negotiation as well as a way to leverage their arguments.  In Lautenberg’s case, he can also use Senator McCain’s, Senator Lieberman’s and President Obama’s support of closing the gun show loophole to create a strong cohort of supporters.  In Engel’s case, he would likely benefit from reaching out to members of the Health and Human Services subcommittees that deal with serious health issues and threats like U.S. drug demand.

In addition, Congressional delegations from the four appropriations subcommittees should schedule visits to Mexico and the border area during the next recess in summer 2009.  These delegation visits, which were quite effective in persuading Congress members like Nita Lowey of the need for increased funding, should be comprised of members from the following subcommittees:

1)    House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs

2)    Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs

3)    House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies

4)    Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies

These visits should last for two to three days, and will require transportation and funding to accommodate the number of Congress members who attend, which would hopefully be several.  Ultimately, we hope that visits will convince these delegations of the need for additional ATF personnel and resources at the border area to control arms traffic.

SECOND ROUND OF ACTION (in the next one to two years)

Justice Subcommittees

After these delegation visits, we urge a member from one of the Justice subcommittees in Congress to propose a bill to increase funding for greater ATF presence in the border area.  If the bill is proposed after the delegations have returned from their trips to Mexico and the border, the appropriations subcommittees are more likely to approve what the bill requests (which, as mentioned earlier, will likely be in the hundreds of millions of dollars).  The timing of this bill, therefore, must be strategic – if it is proposed too long after their visits, this issue may be too far removed from their minds.  The best method is to propose this bill soon after their return, and soon after Congress reconvenes in September.

ATF

As the gun control groups, lobbies and organizations lobby Congress over the next year to support the first and second step of this policy, there will hopefully be more support for expanding the restrictions on imported assault weapons.  Once the bill is proposed to request additional ATF funding, ATF should use the provisions of the existing law to restrict the other “non-sporting” weapons frequently used in drug cartel violence.  Again, the timing must be strategic – as the new bill gains support, Congress members will see that ATF is already making attempts to secure the U.S. from dangerous imported weapons, and that this effort can directly benefit Mexico’s attempt to decrease violence.  The bill will propose that the border areas need more ATF agents and resources to patrol gun traffic and to ensure compliance with the 6,700 nearby arms dealers.  It would be beneficial, therefore, for ATF to already be expanding import restrictions to demonstrate that it understands what the U.S. is contributing to the Mexican drug trafficking problem, and demonstrate how it can better secure the border as well as reduce the southbound flow of arms into Mexico.

Continued First Round Action

Actions from the first round involving media attention and Congressional support should continue into the next few years.  Specifically, President Obama should continue his public support for the five policy steps to ensure media attention on these issues.  In addition, the gun control and health groups should continue lobbying Congress until the measures pass.  Senator Lautenberg and Representative Engel should also continue to foster support for their respective bills amongst colleagues until the measures pass.  Maintaining levels of public support and attention for the components of this policy will keep them alive in public discourse, so that these crucial steps for the U.S.-Mexican relationship are not forgotten amidst other, inevitably important issues.

FOR MEXICO

We believe there are three steps that the Mexican government should pursue to improve the security environment in Mexico and achieve a truly intimate level of cooperation with the U.S. These steps are critical for the Mexican government and its security forces to continue their successful attack on organized crime and a return to domestic stability in Mexico. At the same time, these actions will reiterate to the U.S. the commitment of the Mexican government to improve its national security and cooperate with the U.S. in tackling this common threat. President Felipe Calderón, along with the leaders of the PRI, PAN and PRD, must support these steps to show to the Mexican public and to the U.S. government that they can put their differences aside and form a common front in a time of critical danger to the Mexican state. For too long, the PAN, PRI and PRD, which control the majority of Congress and state governments in Mexico, have bickered and disagreed over action in many different sectors. From labor, to energy, to pensions and international trade, the ideologies and rivalries of these three parties have stalled progress and created a lack of confidence among the Mexican population for their government. The fight against organized crime is too significant to be fought over by politicians. Too many lives have been lost and too much money has already been invested in the process. It is evident in the initiatives put forth by Senators from all three parties that they appreciate the significance and risk of the current security crisis. The elusive common ground between the PAN, PRI and PRD that exists today and the serious threat that the drug cartels pose to the Mexican state have provided an unprecedented opportunity for common action by the major parties. It is critical for the future of Mexico that these three parties come together in this critical moment and act in cohesion to address the security crisis that faces Mexico. This will not only help to reinstate confidence among the Mexican populace in their government, but it will also tackle the greatest threat to Mexican security in a century, push Mexico closer to the U.S. and achieve an unprecedented level of bi-lateral cooperation which is undoubtedly crucial for continued progress and development in Mexico. 

1)    Push through five critical initiatives presented individually by President Calderón and Senators from the PAN, PRD and PRI to reduce desertion among the military, help reduce its exposure to drug corruption, make the military liable under civilian courts in human rights abuses and create a Secretariat of the Interior that overlooks domestic security and cooperates closely with the DHS.

2)    Get serious about corruption and impunity by government officials. Create a system to oversee irregularities and an efficient and independent government body that oversees crimes of corruption by government officials.

3)    Create a tri-partisan committee on National Security and Crime to oversee the progress on national security efforts, the implementation of legislative reforms, to insulate this critical issue from partisan rivalries, and maintain continuity of the counter-narcotics efforts after the Calderón administration ends in 2012.

1) Push through five critical initiatives presented individually by President Calderón and Senators from the PAN, PRD, PRI to reduce desertion among the military, help reduce its exposure to drug corruption, make the military liable under civilian courts in human rights abuses and create a Secretariat of the Interior that overlooks domestic security and cooperates closely with the DHS.

As noted above, the greatest challenge to effective government action in Mexico since 1997 when the PRI lost majority in Congress, has been the continued rivalries and differences between the three major parties, the PRI, the PRD and the ruling PAN. These inefficiencies restricted any major reforms in the Fox administration and have presented enormous challenges for the Calderón administration to pass critical structural reforms. However, the magnitude of the current security crisis has made it too politically costly for major parties to oppose reforms that will help tackle the growing violence. The risks associated with lack of action by the Mexican government to address the drug violence and the popular demand that something be done to reduce it have created an unprecedented common ground by all three parties. We are calling for the President of Mexico and the leaders of all three parties to work together and pass five initiatives presented by their senators and the President.

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

The five initiatives that are mentioned above are, in detail, the following:

• A set of reforms on national security sent to the Mexican Senate by President Calderón on April 22, 2009, which include:

• A reform to the “Law of National Security” which will justify the continued use of the military in the fight against organized crime.

• A modification to the Military Legal Code, which proposes a conviction of 30 to 60 years of prison to any deserter that, joins the ranks of organized crime. Fifteen to 60 years of prison to any member of the military that provides information about the military to organized crime.

• A reform to the “Federal Law on Firearms” which will prohibit the possession of ammunition denominated as “cop-killer” or armor piercing and raise the conviction of this crime to 24 to 30 years in prison. In addition, these sanctions will apply not only those in possession of the ammunition but also those who benefit from its use by being part of the same organized crime group. Police or government officials that are delinquent of this law will also be subject to a 50 percent increase in the jail time.

• To create a new definition of national security which will include interior and exterior security. Interior Security is now defined as the guarantee of the stability and permanence of the Mexican State.[35]

• An initiative proposed to the Senate by PAN Senators Santiago Creel Miranda, Humberto Aguilar Coronado, Felipe Gonzales Gonzales and Federico Doring Casar on November 23, 2008. This initiative seeks to adapt the Mexican institutions to the growing threat of the drug violence. Currently, there are seven agencies and institutions that are combating organized crime in Mexico. (1) The Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), (2) the Attorney General (PGR), (3) The Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), (4) the Secretariat of Government (Secretaria de Gobernación SEGOB), (5) the Secretariat of Revenue and Credit (Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico SHCP), (6) The Secretaria of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR). These organizations are currently attempting to work in a joint effort to counter the drug violence. This initiative proposes the creation of a Secretariat of the Interior, which would be analogous to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in its functions and responsibilities.[36]

• An initiative proposed to the Senate by PRI Senators Ricardo Pacheco Rodriguez and Fernando Castro Trenti on February 19, 2009. This initiative seeks to improve the Mexican military by reducing its exposure to drug corruption. According to the Senate document, over 140,000 soldiers have deserted the Armed Forces since 2000. This poses a critical risk to the Mexican state and to its military, which until recently was widely trusted by the Mexican public. The PRI Senators propose a reward system to provide financial benefits to personnel of the Army, Air Force and Navy who show outstanding efforts in fighting the drug cartels. [37]

• An initiative proposed to the Senate by PRD Senators Lazaro Mazon Alonso, Silvano Aureoles Conejo, Ruben Fernando Velazquez Lopez and Jose Luis Maximo Garcia Zalvidea on April 30^th 2009. This initiative proposes a change to the Military legal code to allow civilian courts to prosecute military personnel in cases of human rights. This comes as a response to the alarming rise of human rights violations by the military during the past two years in its efforts to fight organized crime. It is seen as a critical step to establish rule of law in Mexico and to maintain trust and respect for the Mexican military.[38]

• An initiative proposed to the Senate by PRI Senator Fernando Castro Trenti on December 11, 2008. This initiative proposes a change to the “Organic Law on the Mexican Army and Air Force” to provide the military with the authority to maintain contact and surveillance on armed forces personnel that leave the Army or Air Force. This includes voluntary leave, retirement and desertion. The Army will maintain contact with these personnel and have the capacity to oversee the activities or careers they pursue. This is being proposed as a measure to counter the growing threat of desertion of military personnel that join organized crime.[39]

These five initiatives are crucial for the continued efforts of the Mexican state to successfully confront the drug cartels. These work well in cohesion to reduce the incidence of desertion and corruption among the military and police, increase the ability of the government to confront domestic instabilities, and reduce human rights violations by the Mexican military. Moreover, they complement each other in many ways. The initiative by President Calderón will effectively reinforce the current laws on desertion and treason by corrupt military and police officials. This will enable the government to prosecute more severely those individuals that choose to side with the organized crime groups by motive of bribery or intimidation. In many ways this initiative serves as a ‘stick’ policy, by raising the risks of association with the organized crime. This initiative is well complemented by the policy proposed by PRI Senator Fernando Castro Trenti, which seeks to provide the military with the tools to maintain surveillance of the activities of those members of the armed forces that choose to leave their position for any motive. This initiative will further enhance the ‘stick’ functions of the reforms proposed by Calderón. At the same time, the PRI initiative to provide financial rewards to outstanding members of the military in their fight against drug cartels is a crucial step to reduce desertion and exposure to the corruption that will otherwise infiltrate the Mexican military. This complements the Calderón and PRI desertion initiatives by creating a ‘carrot’ approach to reduce desertion. At the same time it creates an incentive to make honesty more valuable and appealing than collusion with the drug cartels. A comprehensive set of measures to reduce corruption and desertion among the police and to prevent it in the military is crucial for the success of the Mexican efforts to counter narco-violence. The sophisticated training in tactics and arms that is given to the military personnel provides an enormous risk if they change sides. This has been more than evident with the case of the Zetas. In addition, the military is at this point the only law-enforcement institution that the Mexican government can use reliably to fight the cartels. Therefore, all three parties must acknowledge the urgency of the situation and expedite the approval of these initiatives.

In addition to countering desertion, the initiatives mentioned above will help to increase the ability of the Mexican state to effectively fight the drug cartels. The reforms put forth by President Calderón propose a change in the definition of National Security to include the provision of interior security. This change will allow a more comprehensive effort to fight organized crime within Mexico and better coordinate the actions of the different agencies and institutions that are taking part in this effort. This is well complemented by the initiative proposed by Santiago Creel and other PAN Senators that calls for the creation of a Secretariat of the Interior. Such an agency would help to coordinate the efforts of the seven agencies that are currently working jointly, yet inefficiently, to counter the drug violence. The level of violence and sophistication of the organized crime in Mexico and the looming threat to the country’s national security warrants nothing less than an overarching agency that can effectively oversee the actions of the Mexican government. In addition, a Secretariat of the Interior would make the process of fighting the drug cartels more efficient and be able to effectively cooperate and coordinate the actions of all the agencies in Mexico with the DHS in the U.S. This will help both governments to effectively interdict drugs, arms and criminals associated with narcotics trafficking in both countries. At the same time, it will bring the national security efforts of both countries closer together and improve the efficiency of every Mexican agency that is currently combating narcotics trafficking. To be successful, the Secretariat of the Interior should create an annual report of its progress to a Tri-Partisan Committee on National Security and Crime, the creation of which will be discussed below.

Finally, the initiatives noted above will help to counter the recent growth of human rights violations by the Mexican military. This has long been a sticking point in the Mérida Initiative as the U.S. Congress demanded more accountability to prevent this issue and conditioned 15 percent of the Mérida aid to an annual assessment of the Mexican police and military record on human rights by the State Department.  This created a nationalist backlash by Mexican officials in 2008 and has been a sensitive issue ever since. However, the PRD initiative has created a unique opportunity. As a left-of-center party that repeatedly uses nationalism, sovereignty and U.S. intervention to fuel its rhetoric, it is truly outstanding that PRD Senators propose a change to the Military Legal Code, which will effectively make military personnel liable to trial in civilian courts. Such were the demands by the U.S. Congress in 2007 and 2008 before the Mérida Initiative was signed into law and, as mentioned above, deeply offended Mexican sensitivities on national sovereignty. As an initiative proposed by the more ‘anti-American’ of the three major parties, we believe that the opportunity to address human rights violations should not be overlooked. Human rights violations by the military are in many ways a bi-product of their operations as law-enforcement in urban areas. However necessary it is to have the military fulfill these duties given the current level of violence, it is crucial for the government to effectively counter the human rights issue. If allowed to continue, the military will erode its image and deteriorate the trust that the Mexican public has of this institution.[40] As noted by the PRD Senators in their initiative, it is unacceptable that the Mexican military is murdering, kidnapping and torturing individuals, especially when these are the known tactics used by the very groups they are attempting to stop.

An obstacle to this initiative is resistance by the Military itself. Although it is subject to civilian rule, the Military has a measure of autonomy in Mexican politics. Given its importance in the current crisis, it could be difficult for the Military to accept such a change in their legal code and could leave civilian politicians, including President Calderón, in a difficult position and without the means to pressure the armed forces. While it might be risky to press the military for such changes, a cohesive effort by the three major parties on this issue would increase the probability that this initiative is successful.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Within Mexican domestic politics, the PRD, PAN and PRI are the strongest opposition to each other and will usually generate obstacles to reform of any kind initiated by an opposing party. However, the current security crisis, the popular outcry for action, the level of reform on security measures in the last two years and the initiatives proposed by the three parties suggest that a common ground exists and that the three parties can work together on this issue. We especially call on the three leaders of these parties to abstain security reform from the politicking and aggressive attacks that will surely ensue in the electoral campaign this summer. The PAN is likely to use the actions by President Calderón on security as the central premise of their campaign.[41] We know this will make it problematic for the PRD and PRI to agree to enthusiastically move forward on reforms that will largely benefit the PAN before the election. We therefore suggest that these reforms are initiated following the elections in July. Since this election is for Chamber of Deputies and for state governments, it will not affect the composition in the Senate. For this reason we emphasize the initiatives put forth by Senators of the three parties. Furthermore, we believe that initiatives by the three parties should be considered jointly so that the three parties can share the credit for the reform. In addition to this, we call on German Martinez, leader of the PAN, and on President Felipe Calderón to responsibly acknowledge the joint efforts of the three parties in pushing for such necessary reforms. We feel that this will be a necessary step in creating the desired cooperation between the PRD, PAN and PRI that can ensure the expedient reform on security matters and provide the opportunity for the other steps which are mentioned below.

2)  Get serious about corruption and impunity by government officials. Create a system to oversee irregularities and an efficient and independent government body that oversees crimes of corruption by government officials.

 

Corruption is largely seen as one of the biggest obstacles to overall Mexican progress. Even aside from the current narco-related crisis, corruption is rampant in Mexican politics and largely accepted as the normal state of things by the Mexican populace. President Calderón has embarked on a significant effort to counter corruption in the security forces. He has implemented programs to vet policemen and recruits that use regular checks on financial assets and polygraph machines. However, little effort has been directed at curbing the corruption of middle and senior government officials. While officials who involve themselves with organized crime through bribery or other means should be the principal priority of any anti-corruption program, it should not overlook other forms of corruption which plague the Mexican political system. Combating corruption at all levels of the Mexican government is a crucial component of any effort to improve security and the effectiveness of the state. In addition, the political system will recuperate trust from the Mexican public and drastically improve rule of law in the country.

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

A policy that aims to seriously reduce corruption must entail a system of accountability by government officials and an independent commission that oversees progress in trials and prosecution of corrupt officials. We propose a program that builds upon an initiative called “Ley Federal de Lucha Contra la Corrupcion” or, Federal Law to Fight against Corruption, which is in the process of completion before being introduced to the Senate by PAN Senator Ricardo Garcia Cervantes. Such a law would force government officials upon election or acceptance of a post to provide detailed information about their financial assets, interests in companies or business, and the companies or business interests of close family members and friends. These entries would be submitted and reviewed every two years or when a government official accepts a new post. All of this information would be reviewed, compiled and reported to the public by an independent commission. Such a commission would be responsible to perform the latter tasks and to also oversee the progress of the judicial system in investigating and prosecuting government officials and report its finding to the public, the Congress and the Executive annually. This would help to ensure accountability from the Judiciary and reduce impunity of government officials.

The crucial step in this commission will be its objectiveness and independence. Mexico already has an institution that has the responsibility to ensure good governance. The Secretariat on Public Functions (Secretaria de Funcion Publica, SFP) is responsible for promotion of rule of law, sanctioning and stopping corrupt practices, and providing accountability for public finances. However, the President appoints its head and the Secretariat is linked to the administration and its party. Therefore, it widely lacks objectiveness and independence in practice and is inefficient. For this reason we recommend a new and fully independent commission, along the lines of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), the public body that oversees Mexican elections. Given the general trust and perception of independence enjoyed by the IFE, we believe that the Mexican political system has the maturity to create such an independent body.[42]

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Given the widespread vested interests in the current political system by many politicians, it will be difficult to create a comprehensive approach to corruption. If this recommendation is to be successfully approached by the leaders of the three parties and the President, significant and complex negotiation will be necessary. The reason for this is that the three parties will most likely be unwilling to prosecute past senior government officials that are widely known for corrupt practices. Some example of these are the old PRI guard, including former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari and 2006 presidential candidate Roberto Madrazo, the current leader of the teacher’s syndicate, Esther Gordillo, who has strong ties to the PRI, former president Vicente Fox of the PAN and specifically the sons of his wife, Marta Sahagun and the close officials of the former PRD 2006 presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. This is just a small list of the many politicians suspect of corrupt practices. While effective investigation and prosecution of these members might be necessary for serious action against corrupt practices and to send a public message that corruption is intolerable and the government is committed to stop it, the political influence and power of these individuals might make such an approach nearly impossible. One approach would be to allow some form of amnesty to past senior politicians who would otherwise be prosecuted and to begin the process and enforcement now on current public officials. This might be widely criticized by the public but necessary for its implementation. On the opposite end, a negotiation between the current leaders of the PRD, PAN and PRI and the President could result in an agreement to effectively investigate and prosecute every retired member of these parties, regardless of their seniority and influence. This might be useful to prosecute individuals such as the old guard of the PRI and Vicente Fox, but leave individuals who are active members, such as Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Roberto Madrazo and Elba Esther Gordillo without threat of prosecution for past offenses but be liable for any corrupt practices once the program becomes effective. In addition, while it could be politically costly for members from the three parties to pursue this program, this would likely be received with widespread political support and approval resulting in significant damage to the image of the party or politicians who resist this measure. It is difficult to speculate how probable it is that such an anti-corruption program is approved. However, we ask Jesus Ortega Martinez, Beatriz Paredes Rangel, German Martinez and President Felipe Calderón to seriously consider this measure given the costs and risks that corruption and impunity cause to the Mexican state.

3)  Create a tri-partisan committee on National Security and Crime to oversee the progress on national security efforts, the implementation of legislative reforms, insulate this critical issue from partisan rivalries, and maintain continuity of the counter-narcotics efforts after the Calderón administration ends in 2012.

One of the greatest challenges to the future of security reform and the success of the Mérida Initiative is ensuring the continuity of government efforts after Calderón leaves power in 2012. Given the large monetary and human costs of the current fight against the cartels, it is not surprising that while the Mexican public supports the President’s actions and efforts, they do not believe that the government is winning the war.[43] It is therefore possible that if the PAN is removed from power in 2012, and current polls suggest that this is a reasonable speculation, the Mexican government might reduce its efforts to fight the cartels and reach some form of understanding with the cartels. A possible scenario could be similar to what existed before the 1990s, where the government regulated the traffic and allowed the cartels to function, as long as they kept public violence and crime to a minimum. According to Pamela Starr, this is a real possibility and a serious worry among U.S. officials. Given the long-term approach of the Mérida Initiative and any security reforms, it is fundamental that the Mexican government creates an institution that guarantees its priority in domestic politics. We therefore recommend to President Felipe Calderón and the leaders of the PAN, PRI and PRD to consider the formation of a Tri-Partisan Committee on National Security and Crime.

POLICY OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

The objective for this policy would be to acknowledge the importance of security reform and the national security crisis that is presented to Mexico by the drug cartels so that the issue is effectively insulated from political bickering, that the necessary reforms, programs and financial appropriations are implemented promptly by Congress, and that the continuity of these efforts are maintained no matter which party has majority in Congress or Executive power. The premise of this policy is that three major parties in Mexican politics currently acknowledge and appreciate the importance of security reforms and efforts, and the importance of maintaining a long-term approach. Some of the reforms initiated under President Calderón and the Mérida Initiative, such as comprehensive police and judicial reform and the introduction of an oral-adversarial trial system, will take many years to be effective and require a government body to ensure their continuity and the cooperation of the three major parties. In addition, this Committee would require an annual report on progress in the drug war and national security threats from the Secretariat of the Interior that was mentioned above.

We believe that the Committee should be Tri-Partisan, to ensure the coordination of the three parties and avoid stagnation in Congress or state governments. Given the support shown by the three parties for Calderón’s security reforms and the political cost associated with lack of action in security matters, we believe that the three parties already have the necessary common ground to accept this policy.

NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

While it might be possible for this Tri-Partisan Committee to be unsuccessful in maintaining the momentum towards security reform and action, it is evident that the fight against the cartels and a strong stance on public security is becoming a crucial issue for any political party. As mentioned before, there is widespread support for Calderón’s policies and for his efforts to improve national security. During the current electoral campaign, the PAN is accusing the PRI members who disagreed with Calderón as “siding with the mafia”[44]. We can therefore speculate that as the Mexican state sacrifices increasing amounts of monetary and human resources to fight organized crime, the public will judge a party that diverts from this course as weak or corrupt. It is then reasonable to believe that renouncing the war on drugs will be too politically costly for the next Mexican administration.

PERCEPTION OF ACTIONS IN THE U.S.

We believe that these three steps are crucial in the improvement of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico. The three steps outlined above would surely be welcomed in the U.S. government and media. A tri-partisan common front on national security and corruption would be unprecedented in Mexican domestic politics and reiterate the commitment of the Mexican government to reduce drug smuggling into the U.S. through Mexico, control Mexican violence and domestic security challenges, and effectively employ the assistance given to it through the Mérida Initiative.

Passing the five initiatives noted in recommendation 1 will send the U.S. government a message that action is being taken to reduce the risk of U.S.-trained Mexican security forces deserting and increasing the violence and smuggling. Steps taken to stem human rights violations by the army will go a long way to improve relations with the U.S. Congress. The initiatives by the Executive and the Senate in Mexico to counter cases of desertion will be largely appreciated in the U.S. Frequently, U.S. opposition to increased assistance and security cooperation with Mexico cite the number of corrupt officials and the number of desertion among the armed forces. They argue that U.S. training and tactics will end up in the hands of organized crime. Therefore, it is accurate for the Mexican government to implement reforms that will increase the legal punishment for desertion, enable the military to maintain surveillance of their retired personnel, and create monetary incentives to increase loyalty to the military.

The initiative proposed by the PAN Senators to create an umbrella agency, modeled after the DHS, will likely increase goodwill and cooperation in the U.S. Although the State Department has noted the concerted efforts of the Mexican government, and particularly President Felipe Calderón, U.S. officials in the ATF, DHS and DEA would benefit from a more coordinated action by the various Mexican agencies. In particular, the DHS would appreciate a direct counterpart and partner in Mexico with which to coordinate their efforts. For example, through this Secretariat of the Interior and the DHS, the U.S. and Mexico could be much more effective at combining and sharing information gained from disparate agencies such as SEDENA, the U.S. Treasury, the DEA and the SHCP to intercept money laundering linked to drug trafficking organizations. Such cooperation would help to bring the cooperation on national security of both states to unparalleled levels of intimacy, in addition to increasing the efficiency in interdiction and law enforcement.

While the Secretariat of the Interior initiative will effectively bring both countries together, the PRD initiative to modify the Military Code will surely create unprecedented goodwill in the U.S. government, particularly in Congress. The measure to allow civilian courts to prosecute military personnel charged with human rights violations is extremely significant to the U.S. This issue is the most important factor for opposition to assistance in Mexico and the U.S. sees it as a fundamental component that must be addressed by the Mexican government. Until recently, the Mexican government was unwilling to push for such measures. When the U.S. Congress asked to condition Mérida Initiative aid on the premise that military personnel would be charged in civilian politics, the Mexican government reacted in indignation. It called Congress’ proposal a breach of its sovereignty and accused the U.S. of interfering in Mexican domestic politics. This was understandable given the history of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship and the acute sensitivities to sovereignty in Mexican politics. However, the PRD has proposed this initiative because it understands the risk that these human rights violations presents to the Mexican Military as an institution and to the perception of rule of law in Mexico. This initiative is likely to be positively received in the U.S. and will surely help to push the relationship forward into unparalleled cooperation.

Just as the initiative to reduce human rights violations will increase goodwill between the U.S. and Mexico, initiatives 2 and 3 will also help to bring the countries closer together. Corruption at all levels of the Mexican government has always been regarded in the U.S. as a major roadblock to progress and effective use of assistance. For this reason, a serious effort to reduce future incidences of corruption, prosecute former political figures on corruption charges and create an independent commission to ensure good governance and judicial accountability will be regarded as a big step forward by U.S. officials. Trust is a fundamental factor in any intimate relationship and the U.S. government will understandably feel much more comfortable in cooperating closely with Mexican government officials in all areas of the relationship if Mexico can effectively reduce its widespread culture of corruption.

Finally, the creation of a Tri-Partisan Committee on National Security and Crime will alleviate major concerns in the U.S. regarding the permanence of the counter-narcotics policy in Mexico. Such fears arise from the belief that the fragmented Mexican political system cannot ensure the continuity of the current efforts. Should this occur, the Mérida Initiative would turn out to be a waste of resources. A Tri-Partisan Committee will ensure that the efforts to combat organized crime are a priority for the three major parties. This will ensure that no matter which party gains a majority in Congress or control of the presidency in 2012, the reforms and efforts to combat crime will continue unabated.

Hilary Tone is the Communications & Outreach Associate at the Equal Rights Center in Washington, DC (@EqualRightsCntr).  Prior to joining the ERC, Hilary served as the Communications Coordinator for Border Action Network, a Tucson, Arizona-based human rights organization focused on immigrant rights issues across the state.  She is passionate about immigrant rights, and is a contributor to the Center of Public Diplomacy blog on the topic of Arizona’s immigration legislation:

• Arizona’s New Immigration Law: How State Politics Can Inhibit OUR Public Diplomacy
• France Goes Head-to-Head with Arizona for “Toughest on Immigration” Title

A 2009 graduate of the University of Southern California’s Master of Public Diplomacy Program, Tone has also served as a graduate consultant at the University of Southern California’s Writing Center, a researcher for Public Diplomacy Magazine, an intern in the U.S. State Department Office of Press Relations, and a freelance writer. She also holds a B.A. degree in Communication and Spanish Studies from Santa Clara University.

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