The diplomat is unique among a state’s practitioners in the inherent connection between his ethics and professional competence.[1]

In Machiavelli’s realist vision of state power, “The duty of a diplomat, at all times, was first and foremost to further the interest of his own country.”[2]  To accomplish this goal, diplomats were tasked with developing strategic relations with local citizens, advising their leader on policy matters, defending the leader’s reputation, negotiating and observing/reporting.[3]  With this feedback, leaders determined appropriate actions and policy, which diplomats were to execute without question.  There was some change by 1968 when, in his chapter Advice for the Diplomat, diplomatic historian, Thomas Bailey counseled, “the diplomat, like the general, may remonstrate and give his reasons for disagreement, often based on inadequate or localized information.  But when overruled, he must carry out his instructions, both in letter and in spirit, without indicating dissent through facial expression, gesture, or voice.  He must defend his government’s position loyally, even though disagreeing with it.”[4]  Eleven years later, Joseph Heller satirized this unflinching loyalty in his novel Good as Gold: “This President doesn’t want yes-men. What we want are independent men of integrity who will agree with all our decisions after we make them.”[5]

Is it still reasonable to expect diplomats to blindly follow orders without further dissent?  Jules Cambon, a French ambassador, wrote that diplomats must have a, “certain habitude du monde [roughly: sophisticated view of the world].”[6] If the demands of this profession call for individuals who exhibit certain characteristics of intelligence and, broadly acknowledged, core values, diplomats are bound to form opinions that may or may not agree with the official views of their government.  Gordon Craig, diplomatic historian and former U.S. Marine Corps captain, described this as, “the plight of the professional diplomat, whose training and knowledge convinced him that the policy of his government was leading straight to disaster but whose advice was seldom solicited and never followed.”[7] In this case, whether it’s a relatively minor difference of opinion or a full contradiction of one’s ethics, what options do diplomats have to express dissent?

The Ethics/Morals/Values/Virtues/Convictions* of Diplomats (collectively and individually)

*It should be noted that while there are semantic differences among the definitions of the terms ethics, morals and values the literature, and this essay, use them in an, admittedly, imprecise fashion.  For immediate purposes, all should be understood in the broadest sense as convictions of some sort.  The exact nature or cause of these beliefs is of little importance.

Definitions

• Values: the principles of right or wrong held by an individual.
• Morals: the principles of right and wrong held by a society.
• Ethics: an organized routine of standards that inform proper group conduct.[8]

Officially, there is no international code of ethics for diplomats.[9]  In the United States, the closest approximation are broad standards for civil servants, set by a 1951 Senate subcommittee: “The moral standards of the country, indeed, provide the ethical environment which in turn conditions the standards of behavior of public officials.”4…”[10]  Are there, though, more universal, unofficial professional ethics that guide the practice and attitudes of diplomats?   

In an address to the Foreign Service Club in 1995, Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr asserted that diplomats do, in fact, operate under a certain set of “inchoate” professional ethics; however, he did not elaborate on what those may be[11].  This vagueness is common in existing literature.  Sasson Sofer, a scholar of diplomatic studies, noted that diplomats share, “a unity of virtues based on the understanding of the practical benefits of diplomacy,” and, “ethical and social exclusiveness,” but elaborated further by proposing that, “most diplomats [adhere] to principles that are at the core of international ethics – prudence, sound judgment, and responsibility.”[12]

As for the diplomat’s individual ethics, former British diplomat, Harold Nicolson, described the “ideal diplomatist” as having moral influence predicated on seven beneficial characteristics (“virtues”): truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty and loyalty.[13] Sofer stated more concisely, “the diplomat’s ethics is that of responsibility, and not that of conviction.”[14]

Surely, diplomats as individuals cannot be expected to completely sever and ignore their own personal or professional beliefs because they chose a career serving government.  It’s likely these convictions were factors that influenced their decision to enter the foreign service in the first place: “most people are attracted to the public service because of their zeal for identification with a larger good than some narrow group interest.  It is for this reason…we find the highest moral standards in public employment…”[15]  Sofer argued that the very nature of diplomacy establishes an inherent code of professional ethics: “Diplomacy is a unique case in which morality results from both its practice and purpose.  Diplomats are the guardians of the practitioners’ virtues that stem from necessity.  The dignitas of his method and the nobility of his ultimate goal, peace, combine to make the good diplomat tread along a stoic path: toleration, suspended judgment, self-limitation, advocating on the basis of legitimate claims and honesty, laboring for concord and the harmony of interests, and advancing towards the collective good by prudence and moderation.”

Foreign policy, however, doesn’t adhere to a “collective good” doctrine, and even has the potential to contradict it.  It is separate from diplomacy, but diplomats face potential internal conflict when the policies of their country are in dissonance with their own personal ethics or beliefs.  Sofer refered to this as “moral dualism”: “when a sovereign and his diplomats support different policies.”[16]  They also face a dilemma of whether or not to speak up and express their dissent for fear of being accused of disloyalty.

According to literature about ethics in the workplace, “Some cognitive dissonance is a product of values conflict.  When it occurs, the employee has two choices – eliminate the dissonance or do nothing.”[17]  Diplomats don’t necessarily face the same bi-polar decision.  There are varying degrees to which they can bring their execution of policy into alignment with their beliefs or even degrees to which they can dissent, depending on how willing they are to risk their careers.

Degrees of Dissent

When the nature of a diplomat’s disagreement with policy is minor, the accepted solution is to remain silent and carry out orders.  According to the literature, this is the most appropriate course of action as, “an ambassador does not have the luxury of speaking his own mind.  Rather, it is his lot to be forever speaking somebody else’s mind…”[18]  As disagreements becomes more pronounced, the diplomat may endure increased internal discord and seek ways to still carry out policy, but interpret it in a way that is more in-synch with his or her beliefs.  Richard Chapman, a professor of politics, notes: “ethics in public service is about aspects of decision-making where judgment has to be applied.”[19]  This middle ground allows diplomats to embrace parts of policy that align with their beliefs while minimizing those that don’t, and it’s how U.S. diplomat John Cooper Wiley came to terms with his own policy disagreement.

For exactly one year from 1937-1938, John Cooper Wiley served as the Consul General in Vienna, and witnessed Germany’s annexation of Vienna, which spurred thousands of Austrian Jews to seek visas from the U.S. Consulate.  Other U.S. posts throughout Europe implemented visa policy to the strictest degree possible, but Wiley encouraged his staff to act sympathetically and not impose greater limitations than necessary.  The Consulate was able to issue visas to 28,615 of Austria’s 128,500 Jews.  Wiley even pressed his supervisors for additional staff members to handle the caseload, but to counteract the post’s high visa issue rate, they chose to cut positions instead.  To keep up with demand, Wiley hired local staff members and Foreign Service spouses, paying them with his own money.

Even though he was doing as much as he could, Wiley suffered from, “the sensation of futility and utter frustration,” because he felt like Washington was not responsive enough to the plight of European Jews.  His supervisors (unhappy with his liberal execution of policy, but not able to formally reprimand him) sensed this frustration and transferred him from Vienna.[20]

Had Wiley faced this conflict in 1971, he may used the Department of State’s formal avenue for diplomats to voice disagreement with policy, the Dissent Channel.  This is a forum to offer, in the form of a cable, “dissenting and alternative views on substantive foreign policy issues that cannot be communicated in a full and timely manner through regular operating channels and procedures.”  It was developed to funnel criticism about the Vietnam War and keep it out of the public eye: former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a 1973 cable to all international posts, claimed, “We cannot operate the government or the department if dissent is taken to the press.”[21]

The process, however, has weaknesses.  Some question its effectiveness and note that, “of the first 150 dissenting cables, none resulted in policy change.”[22] Others criticize that the Dissent Channel is not an entirely discreet way to question policy.  Before transmission to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, the cables must be authorized by the chief of mission, principal officer or a designated official, with the understanding that the authorizer doesn’t necessarily agree with the dissenting opinion.[23]  This requirement opened the door for retaliation against James P. Callahan and John Treacy after using the Dissent Channel to voice their concerns over visa policy in Dublin.

Even though reprisal is expressly prohibited by Department of State regulations, Embassy leaders, Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith (a political appointee) and Deputy Chief of Mission Dennis Sandberg, were not happy about Callahan and Treacy’s January 14, 1994 cable.  The cable suggested that, Sinn Fein president, Gerry Adams shouldn’t have been granted a visa to the U.S. as a good faith gesture to restart peace talks in Northern Ireland.  Treacy later explained the intention behind sending the cable: “We felt we had a duty, a duty to give the president and the secretary of State our best opinion.”  Unfortunately, they were not prepared for the fallout.

Within days, the Ambassador confronted the two diplomats and accused them of insubordination.  They soon, “were subjected to various forms of retribution that effectively ended their effectiveness at U.S. Embassy Dublin.”  These included denial of access to cable traffic, exclusion from official Embassy events, reversed managerial decisions and being bypassed on visa cases that required special consideration.  Additionally, they both received negative yearly evaluation reports that threatened to deny them promotion and end their careers.  After leaving his post early due to the harassment, Callahan contacted the Office of the Inspector General and made an official report, which resulted in a full investigation that found substantial evidence that supported his claim of retaliation.[24]  As a result, the negative evaluations were withdrawn and Ambassador Smith and DCM Sandberg were publicly reprimanded.[25]

Despite the reversal, incidents like these introduce a “chilling effect” to the dissent process, and diplomats become less likely to use the Channel.  An environment where diplomats are afraid to be truthful has the potential to become toxic: “More subtly are the effects of ethical conflict when employees do not resign.  They may take the form of whistle-blowing, poor morale, disloyalty, strained personal relationships, uncooperativeness, reduced quality and absenteeism.  In short, the price the corporation pays for ethical conflict is lower productivity.”[26]

Many reports suggest fear of retribution and lack of faith in its effectiveness was why the Channel went quiet during the George W. Bush’s administration (in 2002, the Channel was only used six times[27]).  Instead, many diplomats chose to remain silent: “There has been a huge drop in the morale of those folks working in our embassies in the Middle East.  I think they feel that nothing is getting through substantively, that the Administration is not on ‘receive’ mode but just wants to give instructions on matters that it may not understand as well as folks in the field.”[28]  Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes wrote, in 2009, “Officers who have dared to offer unvarnished analysis of policy options have been ignored, penalized, or banished.”[29]

Diplomat John Brady Kiesling encountered this concern when deciding how he wanted to express his dissent about the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Iraq.  “I started to do one of those [a Dissent Channel cable], but at a certain stage I simply realized Secretary Powell was not the problem. The problem was an administration that had already made up its mind.  So the only weapon I had was to go public — that was the only way to put the issue into the public debate.”[30]

Rather than sending a standard dissent cable and maintaining his job, Kiesling opted to send his letter of resignation via the Dissent Channel on February 25, 2003.  Citing his ethical conflict, Kiesling wrote, “I am resigning because I have tried and failed to reconcile my conscience with my ability to represent the current US Administration. I have confidence that our democratic process is ultimately self-correcting, and hope that in a small way I can contribute from outside to shaping policies that better serve the security and prosperity of the American people and the world we share.”[31] He also chose to leak the text of his letter to the New York Times.[32]  It put Kiesling in the center of a media frenzy, and stimulated new dialogue about the coming war: “resignation is a gesture that automatically buys fifteen minutes of rapt attention from the world.”[33]

One month later, two more upper-ranking diplomats followed Kiesling’s example and resigned in protest of the Iraq policy: John Brown on March 10, 2003 and Ann Wright on March 19, 2003.  Brown served for 22 years, primarily in Eastern Europe, and Wright attained the military rank of colonel before spending 16 years in the Foreign Service.  Of the two, only Wright utilized the Dissent Channel before tendering her resignation.  “The department’s response to my Dissent Channel cable was thorough but broke no new ground on the rationale for the need for imminent military action and did not lessen my disagreement.  However, the channel served its purpose in allowing me to offer my comments and suggestions and to get an acknowledgement of my concerns from the senior levels of the department.”   Even though the process didn’t resolve her particular concern, she added, “I would certainly encourage those who have serious disagreements with any specific U.S. foreign policy to let our senior policy-makers know through this apparently infrequently used channel, if necessary.”[34]

In an interview, Kiesling said, referring to the impact of three diplomat’s resignations, ”No one has any illusions that the policy will be changed.”[35]  An unfortunate result of resigning in protest is that dissenting voices leave the conversation, only strengthening the other side.  In response to another diplomat’s 2009 resignation, Richard Holbrooke questioned, “why not be ‘inside’ the building, rather than outside, where you can get a lot of attention but you won’t have the same political impact?”[36]

For those who want to stay “inside” the building, but also make sure their voice is heard, dissent takes the form of an opinion-editorial piece or published article.  This avenue is a dangerous one as the author may be unable to anticipate their supervisor’s reaction, and they could face official or unofficial disciplinary action for speaking publicly.  To mitigate possible fallout, one technique at least two diplomats have used in recent years is to wait for a change in administration before publishing any opinion pieces.  Both James DeHart and J. Anthony Holmes publicly criticized Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “Transformational Diplomacy,” an initiative that requires diplomats to serve in hardship posts and work closer with the military.   DeHart, who was set to join a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan the following year, warned against the militarization of diplomacy, “…while expertise in military affairs is a good thing, should it overshadow all else in a world of shifting challenges — climate change, energy security and the threat of global pandemics, to name just a few?”[37]  He published his op-ed on June 15, 2008, at the tail end of the Bush administration, so it’s likely he was confident that he wouldn’t face substantial repercussions.  It appears he was correct as he received a promotion four months later.[38]  Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes waited until President Obama took office before publishing, in Foreign Affairs, his more strongly worded article Where Are the Civilians?: How to Rebuild the US Foreign Service.  He railed against changes made during the Bush administration, and proposed policy changes for the new Obama administration to, “…revitalize the Foreign Service and make it a powerful tool of U.S. foreign policy.”[39] 

Conclusion

In a Newsweek article, Richard Haass echoed Nicolson’s first and seventh virtues when he wrote: “Dissent is difficult…On one hand, you owe it to your conscience and to your bosses to tell them what they need to hear rather than what they want to hear. Speaking truth to power is actually a form of loyalty.”[40]  This, however, is not an easy decision for most diplomats.  Whether it’s because they feel their opinions will fall on deaf ears or they fear that being truthful will damage their careers, many choose to self-censor or, as George Kennan observed in 1977,  “Many resign at a tragically early stage and seek less frustrating channels of self expression.”[41]

With 14 dissenting cables filed during the first year of the Obama administration[42] {author’s note: this data has not been updated since this essay was first published}, it appears diplomats are feeling more comfortable sharing their views, but Secretary Clinton has the opportunity to make this the most open administration yet.  Her “21^st Century Statecraft” initiative seeks to empower “ordinary citizens” to “exchange ideas and information,”[43]but she would be remiss if she fails to encourage the same from the US’s extraordinary citizens – our diplomats.