Built circa 1991, Cardete Huet Architectes is responsible for this monster – which, remarkably, was the winning design from an open competition.  I found the project detailed on the C&H website.  It even has some more photos, but none seem to capture the intended personality of the design.  My French is non-existent, but Google translate tells me that the blurb on the bottom of the site includes this line: “The Embassy wants to be open and welcoming, but also the most secure.”  Yea, welcome to France, the guard will show you to your cell now.

In contrast, take a look at the infamous Justice Center Leoben in Styria, Austria [even more photos here]

Prisons are designed to keep some people in and embassies are designed to keep some people out, but if it’s possible to make a prison look this beautiful, why can’t we do the same for embassies?

Colombia-Germany Cultural House in Cartagena.

The EU and Canada will join U.S. efforts to shore up election standards, but to truly make progress towards building democracy, Ugandans also need to be involved in the process.  This is where Google can take action to form a public-private partnership with the U.S. and extend Applab’s impact into the realm of voter education and citizen election monitoring.

When an organization that revolutionized microfinance and poverty reduction around the world wants to turn an idea into reality, it needs a strong partner with the technical know-how and financial resources to get the job done.  That’s why the Grameen Foundation turned to Google in 2007 to develop and fund AppLab, a suite of five SMS applications designed to close the information gap in Africa via cell phone technology.  The project, launched in Uganda in June 2009, connects 8.7 million subscribers, their family and friends, to real-time health and agriculture information, as well as an electronic forum for transacting the sale of goods and services.  In a country where 86% of the population earns a living from farming, and there are only eight physicians per 100,000 people, Applab is set to improve living conditions and make significant progress toward development goals in the region.

According to its blog, Applab was Google’s, “first major initiative in Uganda, one of the newest locations where Google is setting up operations.”  It’s a shrewd use of corporate social responsibility (CSR), as Google gained traction in the country by partnering with an organization that is already widely respected.  By warming Ugandans’ hearts to the company before commencing business, Google is smoothing a path to friendly working conditions with government leaders and the public.  This is an important step to ensure its success given a number of obstacles foreign businesses normally encountered in Uganda – namely, rampant corruption. With pivotal elections in February 2011, however, Google has a vested interest in taking steps to ensure stability in the country, and has a unique opportunity to do so by taking Applab to the next level by turning it into a tool for corporate diplomacy.

In January of this year, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of State to monitor Uganda’s upcoming election to ensure they are free and fair.  This springs from concern over General Yoweri Museveni’s extended term in office (since 1986), and the country’s low democracy ranking (101 of 167).  The EU and Canada will join U.S. efforts to shore up election standards, but to truly make progress towards building democracy, Ugandans also need to be involved in the process.  This is where Google can take action to form a public-private partnership with the U.S. and extend Applab’s impact into the realm of voter education and citizen election monitoring.  Through their cell phones, Ugandans can be empowered to take a greater role in the process by reporting instances of ballot fraud, intimidation and other irregularities in places that may be out of the direct sight of official monitors.  Google has the resources and expertise to make this an attainable goal.

Beyond benefits in Uganda, Google’s involvement will raise its CSR profile to that of “corporate diplomat.”  No longer will it follow the traditional CSR model – funding other agencies to make changes on a corporation’s behalf – it will position itself as the individual driver of those changes.  When talking about CSR earlier this year, Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt, said, “You’ve got to go out and take a stand,” and now it’s time for Google to make good on that promise.

Just a few photos from Bogota and Cartagena, above.  The tourism campaign tells us – Colombia: the only risk is wanting to stay. While the guide books and locals will tell you that’s not entirely true, even with some risks this welcoming and beautiful destination is worth visiting.  I was also reminded of the risks when, two days after returning to NY, a bus explosion killed five and a car bomb was deactivated just blocks from the Embassy.  It’s heartbreaking that Colombia’s recent legacy continues to overshadow its rich history and culture.

Working with new colleagues and practicing cross-cultural communication has also been a great development opportunity. While I love my NY colleagues, it’s been interesting to learn how the folks in Bogota approach their work and to hear stories about how they became locally-engaged in Colombia (most are Brits, but not dips). Have a feeling I’m going to miss them when I return to NY, so hoping they have a similar chance to deploy up North.

For now, just trying to get the most it of this experience and learn a few things I can bring back with me to NY. Two weeks left to go…

Since our office book club rotates British and American lit, and US was up that month, I suggested Goon squad for the month’s selection.  The book is an exhausting read, but I was excited to finally meet Dolly, the publicist character my friend mentioned.  Her client is a genocidal dictator who  “[wants] rehabilitation, American sympathy, an end to the CIA’s assassination attempts. If Qaddafi could do it, why not he?”  Dolly’s first project to revamp the general’s image is to give him a fuzzy, robin-egg-blue hat for photo ops.  She was convinced that by softening his appearance, the American public would conveniently forget about the general’s past atrocities: “He looked sweet in the hat.  How could a man in a fuzzy blue hat have used human bones to pave his roads?”

A post-hat news report convinces Dolly her hat campaign worked: “EXTENT OF B’s WAR CRIMES MAY BE EXAGGERATED, NEW EVIDENCE SHOWS.”  Since there’s nothing in the chapter to suggest that Dolly is especially delusional, I chalk this conclusion up to the author’s own lazy writing – of course, it was the hat (and not the new evidence) that caused the war crimes to be downplayed.

Once the public tired of the hat, Dolly was tasked with developing a new project toward the same goal.  This time she imported a failing American movie star to serve as the general’s arm candy.  “The general should be linked to a movie star. (…) Someone recognizable, appealing – what better way to humanize a man who seems inhuman?”  Dolly imagined what Americans would think seeing the actress on his arm: “If he’s good enough for her…that was one line of thinking. And also: The general and I have similar tastes: her. Or else: She must find that triangular head of his sexy. Or even: I wonder how the general dances? And if Dolly could get people to ask that question, the general’s image problems would be solved. It didn’t matter how many thousands he’d slaughtered- if that collective vision of him could include a dance floor, all that would be behind him.”

Needless to say, this arrangement doesn’t work out so well for the movie star, but it netted future job offers for Dolly, “Word had gotten out and Dolly was deluged with offers of work from mass murderers hungry for a fresh start.”  And who doesn’t want a roster of monsters for clients?

It’s obvious the author has no grasp of publicity, PR or PD – or the fine lines that separate these topics, but this chapter can serve as a lesson for those who work in public diplomacy.  Dolly could have created a public diplomacy initiative targeting US audiences, but to do so she should have started by understanding American opinion toward the general.  She might have learned that Americans hated the general’s brutal policies and, to paraphrase Dr. Nick Cull, “Public diplomacy cannot save bad policy.”  Even so, she may have created a campaign that attempted to explain or frame the policies for her audience.

From there, she may have researched the local culture and attempted to find sources of soft power that she could leverage in her campaign, but Dolly never sought to learn more about her client or her client’s country or to even stop and listen to local voices.  This is a frequent mistake made by PR agencies hired by foreign governments.  Their lack of even a basic understanding makes resulting campaigns ring hollow (take Burson Marsteller’s Saudi Arabia initiatives, for example).

So was Dolly doing PD as my friend noted? No!  At best, her efforts were tepid attempts at propaganda.  She put the same, despised contents in a prettier box and hoped her audience would “get it.”

Jan Goldman, author of Words of Intelligence (a dictionary of terms used in the intelligence community), might characterize Dolly’s actions as an attempt at “perception management.” Goldman defines perception management as, “Actions to convey or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives.  In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.”

Words like “selected information” and “deception” scream propaganda to me.  While I would hope that true PD campaigns project a complete and honest message, this is a Pollyanna-ish approach to PD  – where there is a clear demarcation between PD and propaganda.  As practitioners are aware, this line isn’t always so clear.  Dolly’s approach of emphasizing the good in hopes those things will overshadow the bad, reminds me of China’s Confucius Institutes.  Although done in a significantly more sophisticated manner, these institutes highlight sources of China’s soft power while ignoring the more unsavory aspects of life in there – human rights abuses and controls on speech, among others.  PD vs Propaganda however, is an immense subject not fit for this simple post.  So I’ll leave it at that and allow you to mull it over.

My friend’s perception of my work, however, brings up larger topics for a discussion  we should be having as a PD community – are we doing enough to educate the public about what PD is and isn’t?  Is there enough pubilc discourse on PD?  Should we explain PD in the context of media literacy (which covers propaganda, but not PD, specifically)?  The Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs works to educate Americans about the importance of its PD initiatives, but if budget cuts are an indicator, the bureau’s work hasn’t been successful.  Perhaps this lack of success is because the bureau explains the contents of its initiatives, but not the strategy driving them.  Would Americans have a greater respect for these projects if they understood why State does them and what it hopes to accomplish?  I don’t know.  Could this risk showing State’s hand to its foreign audience? Perhaps.  But increased transparency may be what State and other PD practitioners need to demonstrate to Americans and foreign audiences that PD isn’t as simple as “perception management” and is different than what most would characterize as propaganda.

Wrist wallet – http://www.rei.com/product/773712

For daily cash, ID, credit card and passport photocopy. Don’t have to worry about fumbling around with all your money, or showing large bills, and it’s very difficult for someone to snatch it away from you.  Bonus from my experience – you may look like you have a wrist injury and people will take pity on you.

Face mask-http://www.amazon.com/3M-R9211-10-Cool-Flow-Particulate-Respirator/dp/B000MPLVVA/ref=pd_sim_hpc_17

or

http://www.amazon.com/Protex-Respirator-business-medical-personal/dp/B00283POA8/ref=pd_sbs_hpc_36

Masks aren’t necessary for illness, but useful if you are going to Thailand or Cambodia as transportation is open-air.  I used the masks from the first link, and liked them.  The vent on the front helps keep you cool in the summer months.   If you plan on exercising outdoors in Vietnam, given the environmental pollution, you may want to consider wearing these regularly.

Packable shopping bag – http://www.rei.com/product/814150

Plastic bags given out in shops and markets are small and low-quality, so these light bags are a good backup for your haul from the markets.

Flip-flop shoes – when it rains, the streets flood.  Quickly changing into flip flops will keep your regular, good shoes from getting water logged.

Umbrella – for rain or sun.  A must if you are going to Angkor Wat as there is little shade there.

Tissues – Vietnamese restaurants do not provide napkins.  They all have wet naps, which you have to pay extra for, but who likes to wipe their face with wet naps?  Gross.

Spork – http://www.rei.com/product/805196 Seems silly, but you’ll be happy to have it after buying fresh exotic fruit at the market.

Day bag/purse – http://www.rei.com/product/749784 http://www.rei.com/product/735777

http://www.rei.com/product/735779

http://www.rei.com/product/747932

http://www.rei.com/product/747931

(good examples of secure bags)

• strap that crosses over your body (to prevent theft).
• Strap should be adjustable so you can keep it as close to you as possible.  When walking, keep bag on side that is away from traffic to avoid drive-by bag snatching.
• Bags should close completely with zipper or buttons (no open top bags- except for extra shopping bags)

Neck/waist/leg wallet – http://www.rei.com/product/747922

http://www.rei.com/product/617989

http://www.rei.com/product/733910

To hide passport, $ reserves. Please, in the name of all that is holy – NO FANNY PACKS

Power adapters and converters: to recharge your camera, computer, etc.

http://www.thinkgeek.com/clearance/on-sale/9751/

*I haven’t used this particular product, but looks good.  Most common outlets are for two round prongs or two flat prongs with a third grounding prong.

Anything that produces heat (hair dryer, etc) will draw more amps and requires a voltage converter (in addition to the outlet adapter).

If you use a mac computer, the power supply will support the voltage, and you don’t need a converter, just an adapter.  Mac stores sell a world travel kit with interchangeable prongs.

http://store.apple.com/us/product/MB974ZM/B

Strong bug repellent (with Deet) – Off! Sells a product called “deep woods” (or something like that), and it is available in individual use wetnaps.  Bring enough to apply twice a day, everyday to avoid malaria (instruction from my doctor).

Sunblock – I like the waterproof stick/solid sunblock made my Neutrogena.  Won’t leak in your bag and easy to reapply on the road.  Your hands won’t get messy.

Inflatable neck pillow – I have this one: http://www.travelsmith.com/jump.jsp?itemID=8386&itemType=PRODUCT&sortBy=0&referring_url=CMSHP001&cm_mmc=Comparison%20Shopping-_-Googlebase-_-Travel%20Gear%20%3E%20Comfort-_-9551&CAWELAID=198821657 It’s the best I’ve tried.

But this one is similar: http://www.magellans.com/store/In_Flight_Comfort___Pillows_and_BlanketsIF383?Args=

Plastic door stop – for extra hotel security.  Use on the inside of the door before you go to bed.

Travel towel – was good in Cambodia, but most hostels/hotels provide towels.   http://www.travelsmith.com/jump.jsp?itemID=1745&itemType=PRODUCT&path=1%2C2%2C252%2C333&iProductID=1745&sortBy=0

Travel packets of laundry soap – Tide makes packets especially for washing in a sink.  Find them in the travel section of CVS.

General tips:

*Bottle water is very cheap, so no need to buy a purifier.  Ice in Vietnam is safe.

*Avoid raw veggies until you have adapted to the local flora (a few weeks should do it.  Shorter trip?  Just avoid).  Consume local yogurt to help with this process.

*Clothes – business dress for meetings, dressy for evening and/or brunches, casual is ok for daily wear (best if you don’t look like a backpacker, though – will avoid unwanted attention), swimsuit.  Dress conservatively for trips to religious sites, or at least bring a large scarf to cover shoulders and/or head.

*Plane rides: earplugs, nasal decongestant, small pack of baby wipes, snacks (in case you sleep through meals), sleep mask, slippers/socks.

*Set up Skype (load $ for calling landlines in the US, and set to automatic re-load when empty – good to have in case of emergency, and you don’t want to enter your credit card info over unsecured networks should you need to add Skype credits).

*Set up Google Public DNS so you can use Facebook (which is blocked in Vietnam).  http://code.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/using.html

*Bring small USD bills for Cambodia.  Almost everyone prefers transacting in this currency, but most won’t make change for large bills.

Source: http://www.uworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/european_union2.jpg

The political landscape has changed considerably in the two decades since the map of Europe was redrawn following the fall of the Iron Curtain.

The European enlargement process, once lead by the Washington and Europe, is left upon Europe since US attention shifted from Europe to Middle East. Nonetheless, since “the window of opportunity to expand the democratic world that opened with the end of the Cold War is now at risk of closing,”[1] Europe’s periphery presents challenges for the EU that must be addressed with new strategic thinking.

Firstly, Europe has, according to Asmus, fallen into an enlargement fatigue “thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members.”  What Europe needs to do is articulate a new strategic rationale for expanding the democratic West, which seems challenging, to say the least, in the light of the economic melt-down in many current EU member states. Furthermore, many Europeans do not feel the same historical or moral commitment to the potential EU members or see a compelling strategic need to integrate them.  The result of such public opinion is that countries like Turkey, that have been waiting for EU membership for over 50 years, grow weary of conditions set upon them.  As a consequence, the EU risks alienating countries that have aspirations for EU membership.

source - http://uzar.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/democracy.jpg?w=300&h=230

Secondly, in the 1990s, the biggest challenge was securing Europe’s eastern border and consolidating democracy.  This challenge was replaced by the need to extend peace and stability in the region where Europe and Asia meet, i.e. Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan.  This area is situated between “the unstable Middle East to the South and hostile Russia to the north.”[2]  The old policies that seemed to have worked in the first post-communist enlargement wave in Central and Eastern Europe are no longer effective in these weaker, poorer and politically more problematic countries.  According to Asmus, this is all the more reason why NATO and the EU should reach out and engaging these countries earlier and provide “the security umbrella and the engagement of the West.”[3]

source - http://www.agoodtreaty.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/democracy.jpg

Thirdly, the Russia that was once a weak post-communist country that wanted to become part of the West is now “a more powerful, nationalist and less democratic (country) challenging the West.”[4]  It has its own authoritarian capitalist model and uses energy resources as a political weapon, exercised in its policies towards Europe’s periphery.   This is especially significant in Georgia and Ukraine, where Russia tried to halt democratic progress by restricting the energy resources to these countries.  Europe must devise a new approach in dealing with Russia that will continue to have the upper hand until Europe can liberalize its energy markets and diversify its resources.

Finally, the European Neighborhood Policy, approved in 2002 as the EU’s way of coping with the challenges resulting from the new political landscape, is an opportunity and a challenge at the same time.  While securing Eastern borders from external risks such as illegal migration, economic crisis and energy insecurity, the policy also gives countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova  “the chance to participate in various EU activities through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.” [5]  If membership is less plausible as a short-term option, then the quality of ties short of membership must be improved to compensate.  Nonetheless, the question that arises is can the European Union take advantage of enlargement-tested ‘conditionality’ and expect compliance from neighboring countries without relying on the “‘golden carrot’ of membership?“[6]

The EU enlargement process faces many challenges stemming from the new political landscape that need to be addressed with new strategic thinking and adequate policies tools.  Before offering the golden carrot of membership to new countries, the EU should avoid alienating, by constantly setting new conditions for accessing this exclusive club, the countries that have for years acted in accordance with the prerequisites for the EU membership.  The biggest challenge for continued EU enlargement might yet lie ahead and will surely result in a more competitive relationship with Moscow.

Emina Vukic is currently pursuing a Masters degree in Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California. She is an Annenberg scholar,  born and raised in Croatia.  Emina has worked for Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia (for several years as a human rights activist after the war), the Hague Tribunal office in Belgrade, and later for USAID’s Local Government Reform Program in Serbia.  Emina’s public diplomacy interests lie in nation branding through cultural diplomacy, primarily of post-conflict countries. Twitter: @emivuk Linkedin

Shared identity is unsustainable without incorporating culture and sports under the European umbrella.

In 2004, the European team won the Ryder Cup and displayed the EU flag in triumph. Winning a golf tournament under the European flag, however, does not carry the same impact on a stronger EU identity nearly as much as an EU football team win could. Bearing in mind the sport’s paramount popularity on the continent, football remains “a form of peacetime mobilization for nation states,.., a powerful catalyst for peoples aspiring to autonomy and independence”[1] due to the history of the sport, the social class struggle behind it, political activism and cultural boundaries in Europe.  This background makes it possible to draw parallels between European football teams and the process of Europeanization itself.

Football has acted as a factor of identification for individuals and groups ever since the pastime of British aristocrats was transformed to a popular sport for the working-class population.  The sport exuded a sense of belonging to a team of students, workers, trade union or to an industry patron, which was especially evidenced in Germany in the 1930s prior to establishment of the Nazi regime.  The popularity of the sport is largely due to the fact that in this game ‘anyone can become someone’, where status is not acquired but gained.  In that respect the game represents the ideal of democratic societies and purports the idea of European economic integration of both rich and poorer countries under the same roof.

Later the game developed and teams started to symbolize collective identities as well as local, regional and national antagonisms on a continent divided by religious, linguistic and cultural differences. Thus, the supporters of football team Barcelona are “the sublimation of the Catalan people”[2], and their stadium is seen as the symbol of Catalan identity, the same as the Athletico Bilbao is an emblem for the Basques. Rooting for Bilbao is often equalized to supporting the Basque independence from Spain.  On the same note, supporters of Dynamo, Zagreb are generally always Croatian Catholics, whereas the football team Red Star, Belgrade has supporters exclusively amongst Serb Orthodox people.

These associations with the teams are supported by the fact that most teams have selected only local players or players “directly subordinate to the ideological project”[3], as was the case of Glasgow Celtics until the team ownership went to the hands of savvy businessmen.  This division, whether along national or religious lines, forms a strong feature of European societies and is all the more evident in the various European football competitions.  In spite of the reinforced geographical sense of Europeanness, games are often underlined with hostile sentiments between communities or even incidents, and based on the parallels drawn, this would posit that shared European identity may be a difficult goal to realize.

source: http://tinyurl.com/brzypxo

One shining examples of successful integration in European football is the French national team that won the World Cup in 1998 and the Euro 2000.  Half of the team was assembled of players whose origin was other than French.  Such a team best represents a genuine French melting pot, unlike the homogenous German team that won the 1990 World Cup, which comes from a country where minorities organize their own football competitions and rarely support the professional teams in the cities where they live.  These examples illustrate how “football can act as a barometer of integration”[4]. There is, on the other, hand a growing number of Olympic Marseille supporters from among young people of Arab descent, which can be interpreted as the process of identification with the city.

Shared identity is unsustainable without incorporating culture and sports under the European umbrella, and football might prove to be one of the highest hurdles to jump on the road to Europeanization.  Despite the fact that the public supporting the sport has become more socially mixed and more integrated, the sense of belonging to a particular community within a whole is still pervasive, and football in Europe still wears a national emblem.

Emina Vukic is currently pursuing a Masters degree in Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California. She is an Annenberg scholar,  born and raised in Croatia. Emina has worked for Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia (for several years as a human rights activist after the war), the Hague Tribunal office in Belgrade, and later for USAID’s Local Government Reform Program in Serbia.  Emina’s public diplomacy interests lie in nation branding through cultural diplomacy, primarily of post-conflict countries. Twitter: @emivuk Linkedin

**A note from Ren: since Tone wrote this essay in Dec 2008, there have been obvious changes in Spain’s political and economic landscapes.  Given the economic crisis, however, immigration is still a hot button issue in Spain.** 

Introduction

Gatekeeper, guardian, policeman, buffer – all of these terms have been used to describe Spain’s role within the European Union with regards to immigration.

As the EU’s southern-most country, Spain provides a unique example of a nation pulled in several different directions.   Though Spaniards have generally been tolerant of immigration in the past few decades, Spain’s position as the “guardian” of the EU’s southern border has forced Spanish policymakers to not only take into account EU interests, but Spanish interests as part of a larger community.  Spain has much to gain as a member of the EU, economically in particular, but in a post-Franco era, its national identity seems to favor more liberal and open immigration policies.

Though Spain seems to have bowed to EU demands regarding immigration restrictions on more than one occasion, the fact remains that over four million people moved to Spain between 2000 and 2007.[1]  It is no longer just a country of transit through which migrants pass to get to other countries in the EU.  It has become a destination, and a country which stands to benefit from immigrant labor, be it legal or undocumented.   Such mass waves of immigration, however, further complicate the situation because Spaniards tend to blame immigrants for increased crime, economic turmoil, and high unemployment rates.  Cornelius accurately compares Spanish immigration policymaking to a “delicate balancing act”[2]:

[Policymakers] feel that they must maintain enough control over illegal flow to prevent the numbers of foreigners (especially from Third World Countries) from growing too rapidly and provoking a xenophobic public backlash, while simultaneously supplying a low-cost labor force that is adequate to keep the economy growing and attracting foreign investment.[3]

Spain, therefore, is in quite a dilemma.  Nationally, it does not know exactly what type of immigration policy it wants – domestic public opinion fluctuates between accepting immigrants and blaming them, depending on the country’s economic status.

Internationally, Spain is still trying to figure out its role within the EU while simultaneously attempting to appease its European neighbors through stricter policies.  Though it prefers to avoid being the “policeman” of southern Europe[4], the EU continues to pressure Spain on border control.  As if this predicament was not problem enough, Spain’s public diplomacy stands to suffer from these pulls in various directions.  Before Spain can project a positive national image, it must first understand what that image is and what it stands for, especially in terms of immigration sentiment.

This paper addresses Spain’s dilemma in the following format: Parts I and II highlight important background information, Part III comprehensively describes contemporary immigration issues within Spain, and Part IV details implications and recommendations for Spanish public diplomacy.

Part I: Immigration Background, 1975-2004

            Spain has transformed from a state of emigration to a state of immigration since General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship ended in 1975.  Between 1974 and 1977, more than 300,000 nationals returned to Spain[5], signaling the end of an oppressive era that had caused many Spanish citizens to flee their home country.  In addition to the return of Spanish nationals, the end of the Franco era also seemed to make Spain an attractive destination for non-nationals to migrate.  By the late 1970s, the country became characterized by a “double flow” – not only were Spanish nationals returning, but immigration from foreign countries also started to grow.[6]  Acting as its own entity, Spain’s policies were relatively liberal in the years immediately following Franco as a form of backlash against the previous 30 years under a military dictator.  Based on the increased immigration statistics from the 1980s, these liberalized policies reflected well on Spain and its position as a desirable immigration state.

After Spain started to become a net receiver of immigrants in the 1980s, it hit a major turning point: induction into the European Community (what would become the European Union) in 1986.  Its incorporation into this community represented a “wider opening of the Spanish economy to foreign capitals,” and brought with it many qualified professionals to fill open jobs.[7] Such a step furthered Spain’s desirability as a place of work and residence.  Europe as a whole, however, resembled a fortress during the 1980s and 1990s with regards to borders and immigration.  Three agreements, in particular, speak truth to the fortress label, though they are only three examples and by no means comprehensive of everything happening at the time.  First, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and 1990 intended to eliminate borders within participating European countries through emphasis on issues like border control and police force intervention, since illegal immigration was perceived as a form of international crime.  The second agreement was the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, which formed the EU and the euro currency, and aimed to control migratory flows and integrate legal immigrants.  Third, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 was designed to move towards a common foreign and security policy, or to take the Schengen scheme and incorporate it “into the EU framework.”[8]  Though Europe appeared prepared to work with its neighbors during this time period, from the outside, European countries became more inclusive to their own and more exclusive to outsiders.  Despite these three agreements, European countries were still divided on the issue of immigrant integration.  Some states wanted a uniform set of policies to promote immigrant integration within the EU, while others thought that integration policies were connected to state sovereignty and had no place in common EU policy.

Because of Spain’s desire to be part of the larger European community, some of its stricter policies began to reflect Europe’s move towards restriction.  In 1985 for example, on the eve of its induction into the EC, Spain passed the Ley de Extranjera, or law on foreigners.  It was strict with a strong emphasis on border control, and did not expand upon immigrants’ rights to social protections like housing, education, and health care.  Spain enacted this law so that the government could gain “more power to regulate non-nationals” right before Spain’s accession to the EC.[9]  The law was so strict that many potential migrants tried to seek asylum, rather than try to migrate, to gain the opportunity to move.  Spain eventually ended up merging asylum-seekers with the status of refugees, and since 1985, this law has been modified on several occasions.

In 1991, Spain again became more restrictive and started requiring visas for nationals of countries from the Maghreb, a region in North Africa; border closure was essential for Spain to become part of the Schengen agreement.  A few years ahead in the early 2000s, Spain even began introducing visa requirements for Latin American citizens as well, again showing Spain’s dedication to EU membership.  Furthermore, when the 1985 law proved weak in enforcement and seemed to be failing, Spain established a quota system in 1993 called the “contigente” system.  The country intended to channel migratory flow to specific regions and to the sectors of the economy in need of labor.  Every year, the government established a “foreign labor quota reflecting labor market trends, and also specified which nationality [would] be permitted to fill the quota.”[10]  Some have characterized Spanish policies during this time as having gone through the “Europeanization” process, meaning its domestic policy changes were in response to requirements defined at the EU level. [11] In order to ensure EU inclusion and gain the benefits of doing so, Spain seems to have acted largely out of its own national interests when forming immigration policies in the 1980s and 1990s.

Though Spain made bilateral agreements with a number of countries in these two decades, the one with Morocco being the most significant, Spain never created a formal guest worker program like some of its European neighbors.  The government gave out temporary rather than permanent contracts; in fact, most of the 1 million workers hired in the late 1990s received temporary status.[12]  However, though immigrant labor was largely seasonal, there was a series of four regularizations in Spain in 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2000.  These regularizations attempted to grant legal status to undocumented migrants, and policy makers used them as a way to respond to Spanish demands for unskilled labor and to respond to the fight for immigrants’ rights against marginalization and exploitation.  The 2000 process, however, shows the unequal treatment given to certain immigrants – 80 percent of Latin American requests were approved while only 52 percent of Moroccan request received the same.[13]  Province of residence also seemed to play a role in this process, but more importantly, the 2000 version seemed to shift from immigrant integration to immigration control.  Hence, Spain’s back-and-forth immigration sentiment continued into the 21^st century.

One possible explanation for the push-and-pull evident in its immigration history is that Spain has only recently come to terms with the civil war that ended in 1939 and brought General Franco to power.   In 1996, Spain elected its first conservative leader since General Franco, Jose Maria Aznar, at a time when Spain was literally beginning to “unearth its dead.”[14]  Spaniards dug up unmarked mass graves and gave many rojos or “reds” an honorable second burial.  Prime Minister Aznar, as quite a conservative leader, clamped down on policies regarding immigration, refugees, visas and asylum-seekers, to name a few.  His new migration policy led to what some have called the “securitization” of migration, further restricting the laws, and contributed to maintaining “fortress Europe.”  It appears that under his leadership, the government and Spanish people perceived migration as a dangerous security threat, especially as more immigrants continued to flow into the country during this decade.  In moving Spain to the right, he set the stage for left-leaning Spaniards to reclaim the progress that had been made since Franco in the 2004 election.

Part II: Immigration Background, 2004 – present

In 2004, the game changed.  Spain hit another major turning point when three days before its general election in March, terrorists coordinated a series of bombings in Madrid.  Ten explosions occurred on four different commuter trains on the morning of March 11^th.  Up until this event, Aznar’s party, the Popular Party or PP, had maintained a narrow lead in the polls over the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party or PSOE.  Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero was the PSOE’s candidate, and some have ascertained that Zapatero’s victory that year was a direct result of the terrorist attacks.  Aznar’s party had initially tried to place blame on the ETA, a group of domestic terrorists, which would have furthered the PP platform.  Spanish investigations concluded, however, that al Qaeda was responsible for these attacks, and Zapatero became Spain’s new prime minister with 43 percent of the vote, compared to the PP’s 38 percent.[15]

Similar to the United States in a post-September 11^th world, Spain’s terrorist attacks have been a game changer in the years since 2004.  The Madrid bombings reverberated throughout the rest of Spain, affecting public attitudes and public opinion, and consequently, Spanish policy.  Zapatero’s election in response to these attacks shows yet again the back-and-forth pull of Spanish sentiment, and he has since taken the country back to the left in many respects.  His policies seem to be a direct response to Aznar’s eight years of conservatism.  For example, he withdrew Spain from the war in Iraq, legalized homosexual marriage, decreased ties between Spain and the Catholic Church, and expanded women’s rights, given that women now run half of the government’s ministries in Spain, “one of the highest percentages in the world.”[16]

More importantly, there are a couple of interesting examples to convey how Zapatero’s government has liberalized immigration policy.  In 2000, immigrants accounted for only 2.6 percent of Spain’s population.  In 2007, at 4.5 million people, they accounted for 9.6 percent, a large increase from the days of Aznar.[17]  In addition, in 2005 alone, Spain granted amnesty to approximately 700,000 illegal immigrants, an unprecedented move.  Furthermore, amidst much criticism for its stance on immigration, the government proposed what has been deemed the “Grandchildren Law” in 2007.  This law claimed that “grandchildren of Spanish citizens who emigrated decades ago [would] very soon be able to claim their grandparents’ nationality.”[18]  Spain estimated a potential 100,000 successful applicants; consulates in various Latin American countries, namely Cuba, predicted a flood of people applying for Spanish, and therefore European, rights.

Though Zapatero and his government have been criticized for their immigration policies, the media has portrayed Spain in the past couple of years as “one of the world’s most liberal countries,” especially on social issues.[19]  However, some have also pointed out that Spain is a young democracy, and in many ways is still “grappling with the divisive legacy of a dictatorship that ended only 30 years ago.”[20]  Similar to the way in which Spaniards have recently come to terms with their own civil war, the memory of the Franco dictatorship is still fresh in Spanish memory, and influences Spain’s tendency to split into “hostile ideological camps.”[21]

Another important aspect of Zapatero’s administration with regards to immigration is the legal avenues that Spain has offered for immigrants.  In response to Spain’s stricter policies, illegal immigrants have tried to enter Spain in several ways – some pose as tourists and enter through airports while others are smuggled in through what the Spanish authorities call “mafias.”  The most worrisome method, however, addressed in most literature on Spanish immigration, is the use of pateras, or small boats which are meant to hold about 10 people.  Immigrants, however, will try to squeeze as many as 40 people onto one boat.  Used mainly by North and Sub-Saharan Africans, this dangerous method has caused between 600 and 1,000 bodies to wash up on Spain’s southern shore every year.[22]

Rather than ignore this problem, Zapatero’s government has taken steps in the past couple of years to ensure that immigrants do not continue to put themselves in such danger.  While Europe continues to close its door to illegal immigrants, Spain has been opening small windows of opportunity.  For example, Zapatero announced in 2007 that Spain would be recruiting and training 180,000 immigrants in their home countries to meet Spain’s demands for labor while trying to decrease illegal immigration.[23]  That same year, Spain signed an agreement with Senegal to offer legal passage to Senegalese immigrants through a one-year work permit.  Officials hope to bring thousands of workers to Spain through this program and its renewable visas and jobs.  In addition, Labor Minister Jesus Caldera signed an agreement with Gambia in 2007 to invest over $1 million to train Gambians who could be recruited to work in Spain.[24]  This agreement comes one month after two similar agreements between Spain and Mali and Mauritania.  As a final example, Caldera has also signed agreements to help train people in the fishing industry in Senegal, Peru and Ecuador.  Thanks to Zapatero and his government’s proposals, the number of arrivals to Spain’s Canary Islands dropped from 13,000 in the first seven months of 2006 to 6,000 in the same time period in 2007.[25]  Clearly, these legal routes help to both save lives and stem illegal immigration, and will be further discussed in the public diplomacy section (Part IV) of this paper.

Part III: Contemporary Issues

Zapatero’s re-election this past March signals a continuation of Spain’s liberal policies.  There are, therefore, several important issues and realities to consider in order to understand Spain’s current immigration situation.  Though many of these issues are by no means new in Spanish society, they are nonetheless contributing to the complex push-and-pull affecting Spanish public opinion and Spanish immigration policy.  A thorough grasp of these issues can therefore benefit not only policymaking, but Spanish public diplomacy as well.

Economic Realities

The economy in Spain is growing at a rapid pace – one of the fastest within the EU, expanding by 3.7 percent on average per year from 1998 to 2007.[26]  Industries are booming, creating more jobs in fields like construction, domestic services and agriculture.  Despite the fact that Spain has the most rapid job growth within the EU, it also has one of the highest unemployment rates.[27]  Spanish citizens cannot afford to move to the areas with the most jobs available, which are mostly in Madrid and Barcelona or along the coast.  Therefore, immigrants are arriving to fill the vacuum.  Growing labor shortages have triggered a demand for cheap, low-skilled labor, and having imported this labor for a few decades now, Spain continues to need what these immigrants can provide.  The Economist claimed in March 2008 that “immigration is intimately linked to Spain’s economic performance,”[28] and Corkill claims that “Iberian economies require immigrant workers, but have yet to develop effective mechanisms for integrating them.”[29]

This past November, Spain’s economy contracted for the first time since 1993, and the percent of Spaniards left jobless is at 7.95 percent, the lowest level since 1978.[30] Spain’s booming economy until this global economic downturn was largely attributed to its work force, comprised largely of immigrant labor; Spain recently injected $11 billion back into its economy to help spur job creation.  Though Zapatero has high hopes for his stimulus plan, the fact remains that Spanish nationals do not favor the types of work that immigrants perform.  It is therefore reasonable to predict that even in times of economic hardship in Spain, there will still be a demand for and a flow of immigrants.

Migrant Origins and Numbers

Migration trends to Spain have changed over time.  Quite a few western Europeans migrated to Spain decades ago, and North Africans used to be the largest immigrant population.  Today, however, the immigrant composition has shifted.  INE, Spain’s National Statistics Institute, estimates that of the more than 4.5 million immigrants in Spain today, 36 percent come from Latin America, 21 percent from Western Europe, 17.7 percent from Eastern Europe, and just under 15 percent from North Africa.[31]  In terms of specific countries, in 2007, the largest immigrant groups hailed from Morocco, Ecuador, Romania, Colombia, Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Peru, Portugal and Brazil.  Therefore, the three most common sending regions to Spain today are North Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Once they reach Spain, the jobs these immigrants fill most frequently are in construction, domestic services and agriculture, depending on the region of Spain they migrate to.  Coastal regions like Andalucia require more agricultural work, while big cities like Madrid and Barcelona have more positions available in construction and services.

Though reasons for migration to Spain have changed over time, it is important to understand immigrants’ motivations when leaving their home country.  In the 1970s, for example, many Latin Americans in the southern cone (namely Chile and Argentina) fled their countries as a result of political persecution under military dictatorships.  Even though they fled largely to neighboring Latin American countries back then, Latin Americans today migrate to northern countries like the United States and Spain in a “quest for economic opportunity.”[32]  Today, most Latin American migrants leave because there is decreasing chance of economic success, and to escape the crime and violence often associated with poverty.  Western countries seem to provide more opportunity for work and money, and from their wages in Spain, these migrants send remittances back home.  Out of the $13 billion sent in remittances from Spain in 2007, Colombians, Ecuadorians and Bolivians actually sent the three highest amounts, respectively, out of every immigrant group.[33]

Morocco provides another example of dismal economic conditions, giving potential immigrants further motivation to hop the ocean to Spain.  Morocco’s labor force numbers about 10.5 million people, split roughly between urban and rural areas.  In 2005, unemployment was estimated at 1.5 million or 14 percent, though the unemployment rate was much higher in cities, or urban areas.[34]  Economic growth in Morocco has been slow, at less than 2 percent during the 1990s, and the population continues to grow at about 2 percent per year since that decade.  Poverty has risen dramatically, affecting 20 percent of Moroccan residents at one point in the 1990s.  Though many North Africans, from Morocco especially, continue to migrate to Spain, they only sent home 6.9 percent of the total remittances in 2007.  Overall, it is clear that despite past reasons for migration, the case today is that immigrants are in search of better economic opportunities and living conditions, with hopes of improving the situations for those left behind in the sending country.

“New Spain” and Conservative Backlash

Prime Minister Zapatero seems to be working towards a very specific goal: to create a new image of Spain.  In straying far from Aznar’s conservative policies, it is clear that Zapatero aims for a liberal and open state.  Because his policies are so left-leaning, however, many people, both inside Spain and out, have criticized him for being so liberal.  It is therefore unclear as to whether or not Zapatero can fully achieve this new image amidst conservative backlash.

Though polls show that Spaniards are largely supportive of immigrants, a unique view in Europe, there remains a sense that the old Spain, a conservative and religious Spain, has been driven underground and needs to return.  A wine distributor in Burgos, a city in the northern part of the country, said in March 2008 that Spain “isn’t a country for people like [him] any more.”[35]  He claimed that Burgos had been “infected” by these waves of New Spaniards, coming from places like Romania and Argentina.  Burgos is an ancient city under heavy influence from the Catholic Church, and in the 2008 election this past March, PP candidate Mariano Rajoy, Zapatero’s opponent, had many local supporters in this area.   Some of them even admitted to “yearning for a return to the autocratic times of General Francisco Franco.”[36]  The mentality expressed by these Burgos citizens, contrasted with the poll data that shows immigration support, is indicative of the ongoing battle between liberals and conservatives over immigration in Spain.

Immigration was a key issue in the 2008 election, especially for those who feel that immigrant presence has altered Spain’s national identity.  While Zapatero’s PSOE party proposed new initiatives to help train immigrants and strengthen cooperation with developing countries, the PP proposed an “integration contract” for immigrants renewing their one-year visas.  If Rajoy had won the election in March, these immigrants would have had to sign documents committing them to “obey the laws, respect Spanish customs, learn the language, pay their taxes, work actively to integrate into Spanish society, and return to their country if they cannot find work after a given period of time.”[37]  It would also have limited entry for immigrants’ relatives, which is allowed under current law.  Critics called this contract unconstitutional and unrealistic.  Though Zapatero won the election with 43 percent in March, the PP won 40 percent of the vote this time, a 3 percent increase from the 2004 election.[38]  Immigration sentiment continues to pull the country in different directions.

Immigration, Criminalization and Terrorism: Spanish Perceptions

Part of this conservative backlash against Zapatero’s idea of a new Spain may be attributed to the ideas in this section.  Cornelius boldly claims that “multi-racial, multiethnic society is not seen as a desirable goal” in Spain.[39]  The immigration issue is therefore complicated by the various perceptions Spaniards have of the people that immigrate to their country, regardless of their legality.

Huntoon gives a broad overview of general attitudes towards immigrants, which accurately captures Spanish sentiment:

A truism of the public attitudes toward international migrants is that in times of economic growth and labor shortage immigrants are quietly welcomed, while in times of economic downturn, immigrants are used as scapegoats and blamed in part for the unemployment.[40]

In times of prosperity, immigration is often overlooked, or kept low on the political agenda.  However, in times of economic turmoil, immigrants are often blamed, accused of being the root cause of whatever problems a country faces.  This idea is certainly not unique to Spain.  However, in 2007, Spaniards’ main concern with their country was “unemployment” at 49 percent.[41]  Therefore, given its increased immigration flows and large immigrant populations, the tendency to blame immigrants for economic troubles, namely labor shortages and high unemployment, is particularly important to understanding Spanish attitudes towards immigration.

The tendency to blame leads to a tendency to criminalize immigrants for other problems such as crime.  Immigration and crime are strongly connected in Spanish press, and some Spaniards associate immigration with rising crime rates.[42]  The division that exists between “us” and “them” seems to be a prevalent perception among Spaniards, and the perception is even worse when the immigrants arrive illegally using methods like crossing the ocean in pateras, the small boats.  Interestingly, though immigrants are often labeled as the “others,” there is less “otherness” with people of Latin American origin.  Latin Americans share a common language and similar cultural customs with Spanish people; immigrants from Ecuador, for example, are then less likely to stir negative perceptions as Africans or Muslims, who “are more likely to emotionalize the public in a negative way.”[43]   Cornelius claims that Spaniards are aware of and troubled by the potential for massive and unrestrained immigration from North African neighbors as a result of economic disparity.  They are therefore “increasingly willing to blame recent increases in crime on illegal immigration, especially from Africa.”[44]

Specific incidents of crime committed by immigrants only contribute to the tendency to criminalize them.  Most notably, the incident in El Ejido in 2000 caused a significant backlash against the Moroccan community in the small agricultural town near the Andalucian coast.  When a Moroccan immigrant undergoing psychological treatment stabbed a Spanish woman in a local market in January 2000, the community rioted against North African immigrants for three days thereafter.  Protestors put up barricades, set cars and shops on fire, and ran through the streets shouting racist phrases.  The outrage was so bad that the local immigrant community had to call in for police enforcement to help protect their cars and property.  Such events only lead to further hostilities and tensions between Spaniards and immigrant groups, and when incidents like El Ejido occur and are widely publicized, immigrant perception in Spain tends to criminalize them further, with examples to support their pointed fingers.  Whether it is right or wrong, “falling back on criminalization, as the only way to cope with undesirable conduct, is not new in Spain.”[45]

The tendency to criminalize is further complicated by the fear of terrorism.  Since the Madrid bombings in 2004, Spaniards have added another layer to their perception of the “other.”  Since September 11^th especially, terrorism is a threat perceived in the Western world.  Migration, coincidentally, is a phenomenon that affects mainly Western and European societies.  Therefore, a “constructed link between the two – terrorism and migration – has a great chance of drawing attention and finding acceptance in public opinion.”[46]  In her article on the constructed connection between immigration and terrorism, Saux claims that Spain is an ideal example to study the effects that a “fictional link” between terrorism and immigration can have on a given society.[47]  She argues that Spain has followed its Western allies in the popular trend of associating foreigners with the capabilities of terrorism; it is surprising that Spain followed this trend of forming a relationship between these two social phenomenons given Spain’s history with domestic terrorism.

Out of all the EU countries, Spain has the most experience with domestic terrorist groups.  Basque separatist terrorism has plagued the country for years and was politically important in the Franco dictatorship agenda as well as other democratic governments, given more priority than the battle against usual street crime.  In particular, the separatist group ETA has been active for approximately 40 years and its actions have killed more than 800 people.[48]  Clearly, Spain is no newcomer to dealing with terrorism.  Its experience in fighting ETA has offered important lessons on state security and reforming legal issues.  Hence, it is surprising that Spain could not help but “discover” this fictitious relationship between immigration and terrorism along with the rest of its Western allies in the United States and Europe.  However, as Saux also mentions, the formation of counter-terrorism legislation is symbolic because it provides a feeling of comfort, though it may only be illusion.  Norms may be better defined, but the enforcement remains weak.

One possible explanation for why Spain has accepted this relationship is its quick entrance into modernity.  Modernity came about quite suddenly for Spain, as touched upon earlier when discussing how Spain has only recently come to terms with its civil war, and how it is still a young democracy recovering from a 30-year military dictatorship.  Spain is categorized as being in “late modernity,” and still seems to be adjusting to this new mentality and way of governance.  The process happened so suddenly that the country had trouble “[accommodating] the new challenges without losing a piece of its identity.”[49]  In order to catch up to the modern Anglo-Saxon societies, Spain had to adopt a much tougher approach to crime and exclusion, moreso than was the case right after Franco’s death.  Even under a liberal prime minister like Zapatero, Spain has come into these realities on criminalization and terrorism, showing that the country’s adjustments on the issue of immigration are far from over.  Especially with the currently high unemployment rates, it seems that economic realities will continue to drive xenophobic behavior.

Ageing Population

As the Spanish economy grows, it has developed into a knowledge-based economy.  Though Spanish workers have prepared their labor forces for this type of work, Spanish producers “have a material interest in the availability of low-wage yet semi-skilled labor.”[50]  These low-skilled jobs fall into various categories: manufacturing, domestic services, farm labor, construction, etc., yet Spanish nationals often do not want to fill these jobs, even when unemployment is high.  In addition, the labor imported is often younger than the labor available domestically, which is crucial to Spain’s economic success at this point.

Spain’s ageing population is disadvantageous to its economic needs.  The proportion of people over 65 years old in Spain is expected to increase from 17 percent in 2000 to 37 percent by 2050.[51]  Not only does this affect employment as well as labor productivity, but there is also concern over the potential strain on the social welfare system as work force numbers decrease while the elderly population increases.  There is undeniably a need and demand for cheap, low-skilled labor in Spain, and “foreign residents are much younger than the host population.”[52]  In amending or creating immigration policy in the future, it is therefore clear that the need for younger and more able workers may not be able to be resolved domestically.  The immigrants that currently fill gaps in certain industries appear to be contributing to, rather than detracting from, Spain’s economic status.

Spain’s Armed Forces

The enlistment of foreign nationals in Spain’s armed forces if a brief point, but an important one.  In 2002, Spanish enlistment opened to men and women from Latin American countries (excluding Brazil) and Equatorial Guinea.[53]  The specific foreign nationals allowed to enlist demonstrates Spain’s close ties with people of Latin American descent, namely through common language and shared customs; this concept will be described in more detail in the next section.

In 2007, foreign nationals represented over five percent of the armed forces, and the most came from Ecuador and Colombia, respectively.  The South American countries that send the most immigrants to Spain are also Ecuador and Colombia.  From 2006 to 2007, the number of foreign nationals in Spain’s armed forces increased by 35 percent, raising their percentages in the army and navy from 4.69 percent to 6.16 percent.[54]  Given these substantial numbers, Spain’s immigration policymakers must be aware of this reality.  Not only have foreign nationals enlisted to help defend and protect Spain, but they have been invited to do so by the Spanish government.  While Europe, Spain included, seeks to attract professionals and skilled workers, it also stiffens measures to inhibit unskilled workers from entering EU member countries.  Inviting foreigners to enlist in the armed forces yet preventing others from immigration seems to send a mixed message, and one that could potentially influence Latin Americans’ desires to enlist.

Spanish Preferences and Immigrant Tensions

Generally speaking, Spanish sentiment regarding immigration fluctuates depending on a variety of factors – economic stability, unemployment, need for labor, and perceived security threats, to name a few.  A common theme in these sentiments, however, seems to be Spanish affinity towards certain immigrant groups.  Specifically, Spaniards appear more tolerant of Latin Americans than they do of other immigrant groups because of linguistic and cultural ties.  After Latin Americans, their preferences rank in a certain order, which in turn affects how immigrants are hired for work in Spain as well as their ability to gain citizenship.  Interestingly, these preferences have created tensions amongst immigrant groups, a phenomenon that has not yet received much attention.

Immigrant preference and acceptance based on sending region falls into a hierarchy: first Latin Americans, followed by Eastern Europeans, then Sub-Saharan Africans, and lastly, North Africans.[55]  Spaniards tend to favor or have a “more relaxed attitude” towards immigrants from places like Latin America because historical ties play a key role in determining preferences for one group over another.[56]  Latin Americans share a variation of the Spanish language and similar cultural customs; Corkill even claims that in Spain, there is “a powerful lobby that favors privileging Latin American migrants based on linguistic ties and cultural affinity.”[57]  Furthermore, focus group research has shown that Spanish employers have certain ethnicity preferences when hiring immigrant workers.   Overall, the integration of Latin Americans is viewed as less problematic than the integration of Africans, which means that Latin Americans are thought to be more desirable employees.  Specifically, the research has shown that “black Africans are perceived as more reliable than North Africans,” contributing the existing hierarchy[58].  The hierarchy is further established when the discrimination against Moroccans, especially, is taken into account.  After such incidents as El Ejido, the hostilities towards North Africans have only grown and affects their ability to be hired for certain jobs.

The immigrant hierarchy also seems to affect other opportunities given to immigrants.  As mentioned earlier, the enlistment into Spanish armed forces, and therefore the ability to gain benefits from doing so, is only open to Latin Americans.  The Grandchildren Law also gives the potential for citizenship to grandchildren of Spanish nationals, many of which currently reside in Latin America.  The “access to citizenship is easier for certain origins (e.g. Latin Americans) than others (e.g. sub-Saharan Africans), according to the immigration quota system,” which favors immigrants with similar cultural and social traits.[59]  The levels of tolerance and acceptance for immigrants, therefore, seem to depend largely on immigrants’ origins and similarities to Spaniards, perpetuating this idea of a hierarchy.

Because Spanish immigration policies and employment preference seem to favor people from certain regions, tensions have developed between immigrant groups as a result.  For example, in 2002, Moroccans and Algerians staged a hunger strike outside an EU summit in Seville; they claimed that they had been displaced by Eastern Europeans to pick strawberries.  The protesters said they had earned $25 per day in 2001, but were not hired back in 2002 because their employers had opted to hire immigrants from Eastern Europe instead.[60]   Tensions also developed in the 1990s when Spanish seasonal labor changed from Moroccans to Eastern Europeans to Latin Americans.  Moroccans also protested then, complaining that their employers preferred “fellow Catholics,” usually Eastern European women.[61]  Hostilities are therefore not only directed at employers but at fellow immigrants as well, creating another layer in the Spanish immigration issue.  Because the hierarchy indicates preferences for certain groups, and those preferences manifest in employment decisions, immigrants will continue face tense relations with employers as well as those they compete against for work.  So far in the literature on Spanish immigration, this issue has not received much attention or analysis.  Based on these initial observations and conclusions, the tensions exist, but it warrants further study.

Part IV: Implications for Public Diplomacy and Recommendations

The previous sections have detailed important background information on Spain and immigration, as well as the noteworthy current issues that contribute to Spain’s dilemma.  Though all of this information is undoubtedly important for policymaking, it is crucial that Spain’s public diplomacy practitioners consider this information as well.  Rather than try to comprehensively argue for Spanish public diplomacy as a whole, this section will detail the implications for public diplomacy with regards to this immigration dilemma, and how the preceding information could help or hurt the government’s efforts to project a positive image of Spain to the rest of the world.  First will be a brief explanation of the current call to action; second, a discussion of what action the government and non-governmental organizations have already taken that is positive for public diplomacy and finally, Spain’s public diplomacy needs in this area.  Recommendations for what the Spanish government should do going forward will also be highlighted along the way.  Simply stated, how does the back-and-forth sentiment in Spain, this immigration dilemma, affect its public diplomacy efforts? What should be done in the future?

Call to Action

Though public diplomacy as a concept is not very well-developed in Spanish political discourse or in its governmental efforts, Zapatero seems promising for this field.  He has publicly claimed that public diplomacy is valuable in foreign policy, but also seems to understand the role that public diplomacy can play in creating a positive image of Spain as an immigrant-receiving country.  In June 2008, he gave a speech at El Prado Museum in Madrid, discussing both issues of migration and public diplomacy concerns.  Regarding the former, he said that the “immigration phenomenon requires a great effort in dialogue and concerted governance,” and that there are not enough “structures for working together on this in the international community.[62]  In addition to other solutions, he mainly called for a common EU policy.  Regarding the latter, he described the government’s call to action:

It is surprising that a country with such a widespread language and attractive culture has not had until now what we call a strategy and tools for ‘public diplomacy.’  I feel this is an issue of great importance, and in this legislature shall change this situation.  The Government is going to create a Public Diplomacy Commission, with myself as Chairman.  It will feature members of the Government, civil society, the media and the world of culture and business, and each year will analyze Spain’s projection in all areas and propose future strategies.[63]

Though the government has not devoted many resources to public diplomacy before, it is never too late to begin the process, especially amidst other Western countries that have also recently discovered the importance of this field.  Spain is by no means behind, but given the urgency of the immigration issue in the 2008 election, Zapatero’s concerns and call to create a Commission seems appropriate.  In order to move forward, however, the government should first recognize what has already been done that portrays Spain in a positive light, and what efforts they should continue and expand upon.

Existing Efforts

Corkill claims that “danger exists” when governments succumb to xenophobic reactions and ignore the contributions immigrants make to Iberian economies.[64]  He argues, rather, that governments should invest in education and training for these immigrants.  Zapatero’s administration seems to have taken this advice to heart, evident in the earlier discussion about the legal routes Spain offers to immigrants who want to work in the country.  To briefly summarize those routes, Spain has signed agreements with Senegal to allow workers to migrate under renewable one-year visas, with Gambia, Mali and Mauritania to invest in workers to recruit to Spain, and with Senegal, Peru and Ecuador to help train workers in the fishing industry.  In addition, Zapatero announced in 2006 that it would use 2007 to recruit and train 180,000 immigrants in their home countries to meet Spain’s demand for labor while quelling illegal immigration.  Publicizing such efforts and agreements is beneficial for public diplomacy because it shows that Spain is dedicated to not only saving the lives of those immigrants who might use dangerous means to migrate, but it also shows that Spain understands its need for immigrant labor, and is willing to invest to time and energy to create such labor before bringing it into the country, and on legal grounds.

One of the best steps that Spain has taken recently is spreading its diplomatic influence.  Spain unveiled a three-year plan for Africa in 2006 to “raise Spain’s profile in the region,” a goal directly compatible with public diplomacy work.[65]  The most notable accomplishments, however, have been the new Spanish embassies in Cape Verde, Mali, Niger, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, and newly installed full-time diplomatic representatives in Liberia, Gambia and Sierra Leone.  Presence in a foreign country easily allows for public diplomacy practitioners to communicate Spain’s message within that country.  Though these steps are positive, Spain should also make efforts to heighten its profile in the most common sending regions, namely Morocco, and countries in Latin America.  Focusing on Africa is a good start for now, but it is only the beginning.

A lot of the diplomatic work on the ground has been pursued largely by NGOs, or third-sector organizations.  Though their work is positive and should continue, the government could learn from and adopt some of their methods to improve its public diplomacy.  Overall, NGOs have played two important roles for immigrants – they have filled the gaps for people whom the government does not protect and they have functioned as advocacy groups for immigrants as well.  Advocacy, especially, is important for public diplomacy, meaning these NGOs have valuable contributions to Spain’s image.  As an example, when immigrants in Spain faced marginalization in the health care system, these third-sector organizations intervened and “became essential for the reduction of the mot extreme cases of social exclusion.”[66]  They cared for the ones the government did not protect, therefore filling the gap.  Governmental work to this effect would surely boost the perception of Spain worldwide, especially to those sending regions whose potential immigrants are concerned about the health and safety of migrating to Spain.  If the government was to take it a step further and actually advocate on behalf of immigrant groups, it would undoubtedly define and promote Spain’s image as an immigrant-friendly country, benefiting its public diplomacy efforts.  NGOs are often overlooked in public diplomacy work, and it seems that Spain could stand to learn from the work its third-sector organizations are already pursuing and have been pursuing for years.

Public Diplomacy Needs

Spanish immigration policy has gone back and forth.  From a dictatorship, to newly-discovered freedoms, to forced conservatism under EU pressure, all to arrive at the current liberal policies under Zapatero’s government.  Spanish public opinion of immigration seems to fluctuate equally, if not more, often.  Changing policies coupled with temperamental attitudes make for a complex situation, further complicated by the various current issues described in the third section.  Amidst this chaos, Spain seems to have lost track of its immigration narrative, which has profound negative consequences for its public diplomacy.  As mentioned in the introduction, and as clearly indicated by the information in this paper, Spaniards still do not know what type of immigration policy they want; before the government can project an accurate and positive image of Spain to the rest of the world, it must first understand what that image is and what it stands for.  In creating a new narrative, one that exudes immigrant inclusion but also stems the dangers of illegal immigration, Spain will be in a much better position to recruit, train and receive a controlled amount of immigration, and can then publicize that success to better its national image.

To this degree, there are two specific recommendations Spain should put to practice: 1) eliminate mixed messages in creating this narrative and 2) create both domestic and international campaigns to define Spain’s position on the immigration issue.  Mixed messages, such as Spain’s need for immigrants yet their hostilities towards Moroccans, will hurt the country’s image not only in the sending regions, but worldwide.  Especially during the current economic crisis, Spain needs to appear ready and willing to control the immigration issue while still finding legal means of bringing in immigrant labor to benefit the economy.  In order for Spain to send clear messages, however, public opinion needs to be on board with the policies.  That said, there is first a need to create a domestic campaign to show the national audience that there is a link between immigration and economic growth.  Though public diplomacy is largely responsible for conveying messages internationally, it has to change the narrative at home so that its messages are believable.  A change in attitudes will not happen overnight, but if Zapatero’s administration makes an effort to educate its citizens through broadcast media, online information, short videos, etc., it is likely that Spain will begin to see a shift in its attitudes towards immigrants.  Once this shift occurs, public diplomats can then pursue an international campaign that not only clearly defines Spain’s stance on immigration, but also shows its domestic support for this stance.  An international campaign without domestic support behind it would be futile and negative for public diplomacy because it would again send mixed messages.  Hence, the domestic campaign to solidify support for controlled immigration must yield success before sending this message worldwide.

Literature on this topic calls for similar action, without identifying exactly its benefits for public diplomacy.  Persuading the native population to understand the positive consequences of immigration is a common theme, and most literature acknowledges that south-north migration will only continue, creating the potential for further north-south tensions.  Without effective public diplomacy from the Spanish government, these tensions could worsen before Spain has the chance to redefine and promote its immigration narrative.

Conclusion

This paper has provided a wealth of information on Spain and immigration meant to inform the policymaker and help the public diplomacy practitioner.  If Spanish policymakers have a better understanding of how Spain arrived at its current situation and the realities that Spanish society faces regarding immigration today, they are more likely to make more conscious and effective decisions in the future.  These decisions will lend well to creating a positive image of Spain on the immigration issue, and give public diplomats the information they need to promote this image.

Though Spain is its own country, it does serve a crucial role within the EU as the guardian of the southern border.  Spain should by no means disregard this role and the benefits that come with being part of a larger community.  However, Spain still has an obligation to pursue public diplomacy nationally and internationally with regards to the immigration issue.  It is in a unique dilemma that no other country within the EU has faced before, but in pursuing and promoting a new narrative, Spain has the power to bring positive consequences to not only itself, but to the EU as well.  A change in its immigration narrative is crucial to improving its public diplomacy, and therefore its image, to the rest of the world.  Because it is pulled in so many different directions, Spanish public diplomats must take care to convey a clear and positive immigration message.  This message of inclusion yet control will not only benefit the perception of Spain worldwide, but will also help to create a positive image of the EU and its stance on immigration.  Therefore, in creating effective policies and firm foundations for Spanish public diplomacy, everyone wins.

Hilary Tone is the Communications & Outreach Associate at the Equal Rights Center in Washington, DC (@EqualRightsCntr).  Prior to joining the ERC, Hilary served as the Communications Coordinator for Border Action Network, a Tucson, Arizona-based human rights organization focused on immigrant rights issues across the state.  She is passionate about immigrant rights, and is a contributor to the Center of Public Diplomacy blog on the topic of Arizona’s immigration legislation:

• Arizona’s New Immigration Law: How State Politics Can Inhibit OUR Public Diplomacy
• France Goes Head-to-Head with Arizona for “Toughest on Immigration” Title

A 2009 graduate of the University of Southern California’s Master of Public Diplomacy Program, Tone has also served as a graduate consultant at the University of Southern California’s Writing Center, a researcher for Public Diplomacy Magazine, an intern in the U.S. State Department Office of Press Relations, and a freelance writer. She also holds a B.A. degree in Communication and Spanish Studies from Santa Clara University.

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